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ABSTRACT 
 
RUSSELL EMMETT TRIPLETT: Protection for Sale with Natural Barriers to 
Trade 
(Under the direction of Patrick Conway) 
 
 This dissertation adopts a political-economy perspective to disentangle the 
mutual endogeneity of imports and protectionist trade policy.  The theoretical 
contribution is an extension of the “Protection for Sale” model that includes 
heterogeneous firms, monopolistic competition and fixed costs of trade.  The 
relationship between the import-penetration ratio and the degree of protection is 
shown to be nonmonotonic and does not depend on exogenous variation in political 
activity.  Rather, variation in the fixed costs of trade produces industries that differ 
in their vulnerability to import competition and consequently place different values 
on protection.  This effect is illustrated in both small-country and large-country 
versions of the model.  The empirical contribution consists of a novel application of 
indirect inference and nonlinear GMM to estimate the structural parameters using 
U.S. data.  Most notably, the estimates suggest that the U.S. government values 
political contributions from import-competing industries at approximately thrice the 
rate it values consumer welfare. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 What is the relationship between imports and protectionist trade policies?  
The standard approach to this question in the international trade literature is to 
treat trade policies as exogenous variables and focus on the effects of changes in 
trade policies on other economic variables.  In this view, an episode of trade 
liberalization raises the level of imports much as would a fall in transportation or 
transaction costs.  Yet unlike transportation costs, trade policies are inherently 
political; they are the outcome of a decision-making process that is in turn influenced 
by the very economic variables the policies are designed to shape.  Thus, this 
dissertation considers the question by emphasizing the counterfactual claims inherent 
in any causal explanation of trade and trade policies.  This is the approach of the 
political economy and public choice literature, where trade policies are endogenously 
determined by a policy maker maximizing a weighted objective function 
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incorporating both consumer welfare and political contributions by import-competing 
industries. 
 The goal of this dissertation is to disentangle the mutual endogeneity of 
imports and protection.  From a theoretical perspective, this goal is accomplished 
through the derivation and exploration of a political-economy model of trade in 
which trade policy and trade levels are simultaneously determined.  From an 
empirical perspective, this goal is accomplished through the estimation of a 
structural model drawn from the theory, where two different econometric strategies 
are employed to aid inference.  The remainder of this chapter offers a detailed review 
of the existing theoretical and empirical literature. 
 Chapter 2 introduces a new theoretical model designed to disentangle the 
simultaneous relationship between imports and protection.  It marries the political 
apparatus of the “Protection For Sale” framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
to a model of trade in the tradition of Melitz (2003), featuring heterogeneous firms, 
monopolistic competition, free entry, variable trade costs and fixed trade costs.  In 
this type of model, domestic firms compete with foreign firms, consumers view 
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domestic and foreign varieties as imperfect substitutes, and barriers to trade affect 
both the extensive margin of trade (the number of foreign varieties competing in the 
home market) and the intensive margin of trade (the market share of a given foreign 
firm).  This model provides a richer economic environment than appears in the 
existing political-economy literature, generating industries whose structure and 
organization vary even in the absence of political trade barriers.  Thus, this model 
affords us the opportunity to explore counterfactual scenarios—what would an 
industry look like and how much foreign competition would it face without political 
trade barriers—that influence decision making.  The crux of the model is the 
simultaneous existence of ‘natural’ barriers to trade (barriers that are beyond the 
control of economic or political decision-makers) and political trade barriers (barriers 
that are set by the authority of the government and are subject to political 
pressure).  Chapter 2 offers a series of comparative static effects (using both small- 
and large-country assumptions) that point up three important contributions to the 
literature: a negative relationship (or substitution effect) between the fixed cost of 
trade and the equilibrium level of protection; a non-monotonic relationship between 
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the equilibrium levels of the import-penetration ratio and protection; and the 
simultaneous determination of imports, protection, industrial organization and 
political contributions, all conditioned on the extent of ‘natural’ trade barriers. 
 Chapter 3 offers an empirical assessment of the theoretical model.  The 
empirical model consists of four structural equations that simultaneously determine 
the level of protection, the import-penetration ratio, the import elasticity and the 
extensive margin of trade (the ratio of foreign to domestic varieties), all drawn from 
the theoretical model in chapter 2.  Unfortunately, we are unable to write the 
corresponding reduced-form equations, and the nonlinearities and simultaneity that 
characterize the model complicate inference using standard techniques.  Thus, we 
pursue two estimating strategies that address these hazards differently, checking for 
robustness, testing specifications and testing hypotheses in each. 
 The first estimation strategy is a novel application of the method of indirect 
inference.  More common in the time-series literature, indirect inference is 
nevertheless beginning to appear in applied microeconomics, and to our knowledge 
this dissertation represents the first application to a model of trade.  This technique 
5 
 
uses the coefficient estimates from an auxiliary model as targets for a simulation-
based matching algorithm.  The algorithm searches over possible values of the 
structural parameters and selects those that minimize the distance between the 
coefficient estimates of the auxiliary model and the corresponding coefficient 
estimates that emerge in a simulated version of the structural model.  Gourierourx et 
al. (1993) show that this algorithm produces estimates that are consistent and n  
asymptotically normal for any fixed number of simulations.  As Li (2010) notes, this 
is an especially attractive feature of indirect inference as it allows us to test 
hypotheses using standard methods for comparing constrained and unconstrained 
values of the objective function. 
 The second empirical strategy appears in appendix 1 of chapter 3.  It consists 
of an application of nonlinear GMM to the same empirical model.  Nonlinear GMM 
is an instrumental-variables estimator, so unlike the method of indirect inference, it 
relies on a set of exogeneity assumptions.  Due to data limitations, we are unable to 
instrument all four endogenous variables.  Rather, we move the extensive margin of 
trade to the right-hand side and treat it as an exogenous regressor.  This has the 
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potential to bias the resulting estimates, so our GMM results are best viewed in 
comparison to those produced by the indirect inference approach.  Insofar as they 
produce different results, we interpret that difference as evidence of bias. 
 The model is estimated using original data from Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000), consisting of a single cross-section of U.S. manufacturing 
industries classified according to the 4-digit SIC.  This data is then augmented by a 
number of variables capturing industry characteristics and a measure of the 
extensive margin of trade.  The parameter estimates are within the ranges predicted 
by theory.  Most notably, our estimates suggest that the U.S. government values 
political contributions from import-competing industries at approximately three 
times the rate it values consumer welfare.  This finding differs statistically and 
substantively from previous research. 
Literature Review 
 The political-economy approach to economic policy making is at least as old 
as Schattschneider’s (1935) seminal work on the political ‘logrolling’ that produced 
the Smoot-Hawley tariff.  He showed how individual legislators with particular 
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sectoral and sectional interests could take advantage of the institutional structures of 
Congress, trade votes one for another and end up passing what has become a 
paragon of short-sighted economic policy.  His central theme—how special interests 
can win out over the common good—has continued to motivate the political-
economic literature right up to the present. 
 Two other early pioneers in this tradition are Olson (1965) and Caves (1976).  
Both of these authors recognize that most economic policies create winners and 
losers.  Accordingly, they each explore and conjecture why some sectors and 
segments of the economy are able to influence economic policy more than others.  
Caves’s ‘adding machine’ model emphasized raw voting strength—those sectors with 
the most employees should have a disproportionate ability to emphasize policy.  
Hence he predicted that the level of protection across industries would be positively 
correlated with the number of employees in each industry.  By contrast, Olson 
argued that the variation in industries’ effectiveness in shaping economic policy 
depended on their ability to organize effectively.  Interest groups face a coordination 
problem whereby individual members have an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of 
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others.  Olson suggested that smaller, more concentrated industries would be better 
able to overcome these organizational barriers and thus lobby the government with 
greater success. 
 This difference in emphasis—between voters on the one hand and lobbying on 
the other—gave rise to the two main branches within the literature on the political 
economy of trade.  Mayer’s (1984) foundational ‘median-voter’ model links the 
determination of trade policy to the economic preferences of voters.  In a world 
where democratic decision making reflects voting strength and voters have single-
peaked preferences, economic policy should reflect the preferences of the median 
voter.  Set in the context of a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade, the median 
voter approach suggests that trade policy will almost always be biased in favor of 
labor.  Hence, capital-abundant countries are predicted to adopt policies that inhibit 
trade while labor-abundant countries are predicted to adopt policies that promote 
trade.  Dutt and Mitra (2001) extend the median-voter approach to account for 
changes in factor ownership.  They predict that an increase in inequality will lead to 
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more restrictive trade policies in capital-abundant countries and less restrictive trade 
policies in labor-abundant countries. 
 The median voter model has received only limited empirical support (Dutt 
and Mitra 2001), and it is poorly suited for explaining industry-level variation in 
protection (Helpman 1997).  The second branch of the political-economy literature, 
the interest-group approach, has made much more progress on this score and as a 
result has become the dominant paradigm.  In this framework, interest groups with 
preferences over trade policies lobby the government and offer political 
contributions.  These contributions are used by the government (or parties within 
the government) to be elected and/or reelected.  The differences within this branch 
of the literature reflect different ways of conceptualizing political competition and 
the translation of contributions into policy. 
 Findlay and Wellisz’s (1982) model postulates a ‘tariff formation function.’  
The incumbent government’s choice of tariff is the outcome of a lobbying 
competition between opposing lobbies, where each lobby chooses a level of political 
contributions to maximize its own net benefit.  The equilibrium tariff is the result of 
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the noncooperative game played by the lobbies.  In similar fashion, Hillman (1982) 
presents a ‘political support function’ in which the government must balance the 
interests of an industry lobby seeking protection against losses to consumer utility.  
In this approach, the government trades political contributions from the lobby 
against the dissatisfaction of the larger electorate.  Notably, in both these cases, the 
form of the tariff equation is assumed rather than derived. 
 Magee, Brock and Young (1989) [MBY] conceptualize interest-group 
competition within a framework of political parties vying for power. Their economy 
consists of two goods and two factors in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework.  Under 
standard small-country and competitive assumptions, MBY appeal to the Stolper-
Samuelson results to generate political activity.  Rather than modeling industry-
specific lobbying efforts, MBY envision a political battle between capital and labor.  
The political process mirrors the economy—two organized interest groups, 
representing capital and labor respectively, lobby two political parties that compete 
in elections. 
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 An important assumption in this model is the existence of a large segment of 
voters, unorganized and unaffiliated, whom the political parties must sway in order 
to win elections.  The parties can ‘buy’ votes using the campaign contributions 
solicited from the lobbies, but the voters dislike distortionary policies, so the parties 
must balance the effects of their proposed trade policy against the contributions they 
receive.  The result is a three-stage game in which the parties choose policy 
platforms designed to maximize their probability of winning the election, the lobbies 
then choose contributions designed to maximize the incomes of their members and 
the voters act non-strategically.  Put differently, the parties play a Nash game 
against each other, the lobbies play a Nash game against each other, and the parties 
are Stackelberg leaders with respect to the lobbies. 
 Grossman and Helpman (1994) [GH] set the stage for much of the current 
literature on the political economy of trade policy.  Their “Protection For Sale” 
[PFS] model has become a workhorse in the interest-group literature.  GH combine a 
simple model of trade with a common-agent menu auction in which industrial lobbies 
simultaneously “buy” trade protection from the government with political 
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contributions.  The government must weigh policies among different sectoral lobbies 
(as in Findlay and Wellisz 1982) and balance industry interests against consumer 
interest (as in Hillman 1982 and MBY 1989).  There are no voters, no political 
parties and no elections.  However, the most remarkable aspect of the model is that, 
unlike its predecessors, the PFS framework endogenously determines the functional 
relationship between lobbying contributions, trade policy and social welfare.  GH 
provide micro-foundations, drawn from contract theory, for the form of the political 
contribution function and the modified objective function of the government. 
 The political aspects of the PFS framework are widely acknowledged as 
innovative, but the underlying model of trade and the economy is remarkably 
simple.  The GH model features a small open economy with Ricardo-Viner 
technology: n goods are produced using mobile labor and specific factors, and one 
numeraire good produced under constant returns to scale using only labor.  
Individuals have quasi-linear preferences, own labor and at most one specific factor, 
and receive redistributed tariff revenues.  The owners of at least some of the specific 
factors are able to overcome the collective action problem and organize politically, 
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forming a lobby to represent their industry.  These lobbies seek to influence 
government policy so as to maximize the aggregate utility of its members.  The 
government sets trade policy to maximize a combination of social welfare and 
political contributions from the lobbies. 
 The interaction between the government and the lobbies takes the form of a 
menu-auction where the government is the common agent.  In the first stage, lobbies 
set their contribution schedules, specifying a level of political contributions for each 
possible vector of trade policies.  Lobbies take into account the government’s 
objective function and take as given the contribution schedules of all other lobbies.  
Assuming differentiability of the schedules, GH demonstrate that the lobbies can do 
no better than to offer truthful (regret free) contribution schedules, and this 
restriction pins down a unique equilibrium.1  These contribution schedules are linear 
combinations of the utility of all lobby members less a constant determined in 
equilibrium. 
                                                           
1 The derivation draws heavily on Bernheim and Whinston (1986). 
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 In the second stage, the government chooses a policy vector given the 
contribution schedules of the lobbies.  The government’s objective function is a 
weighted sum of social welfare and political contributions.  The equilibrium trade 
policies are then determined by the government’s first order condition and typically 
take the form2 
 
 
1 1
1
1 (1 )
j j L
j L j j
t I a
t a e Zα
   −         = −        + − +        
 (1.1) 
where j indexes industries, α  is the weight placed on political contributions relative 
to social welfare, 
j
I  is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the industry is 
organized politically and 0 if it is not, 
L
a  is the proportion of the population that 
belongs to a politically organized industry, 
j
e  is the (absolute) price elasticity of 
import demand, and 
j
Z  is the import-penetration ratio, defined here as the ratio of 
the value of imports to total industry consumption.3 
                                                           
2 The notation used here is consistent with usage in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
3 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) point out that the same expression emerges from a Nash bargaining 
game where trade policies are chosen to maximize the joint surplus of all parties. 
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 The tariff equation in (1.1) offers predictions regarding the relationship 
between tariff levels, political structure, political organization and industry 
characteristics.  Specifically, tariffs rise when governments place less weight on 
consumer welfare and when a smaller proportion of the population is organized.  
Conversely, free trade ensues when the government is concerned with consumer 
welfare exclusively, or when all consumers belong to organized industries; in the 
latter case, there are no unorganized groups to exploit and political rivalry results in 
lobbies perfectly offsetting each other.  The effect of the import elasticity follows 
from standard Ramsey-rule logic—welfare loss is minimized by taxing goods with 
lower demand elasticities. 
 The difference between organized and unorganized industries is central to the 
predictions of the original article.  Assuming 1
L
a < , the level of protection falls with 
increases in the import-penetration ratio for organized industries ( 1)
j
I = , while 
unorganized industries are unable to buy protection.4  The import-penetration ratio 
serves as a measure of the relative stakes of protection—the higher is domestic 
                                                           
4 Strictly speaking, the model predicts that unorganized industries are characterized by import 
subsidies. 
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output, all else equal, the higher are the potential benefits of protection to a given 
industry.  Conversely, the higher is the level of imports, all else equal, the higher are 
the costs of protection to consumers and hence for the government.  This result 
seems counterintuitive, as we would expect increased imports to trigger greater 
demand for protection.  It is important to recognize, however, that equation (1.1) is 
neither a demand nor a supply equation per se.  Rather, it is an equilibrium 
condition linking endogenous variables.  In equilibrium, industries with higher 
import-penetration ratios are associated with lower tariffs both because lower tariffs 
permit greater flows of imports and because greater flows of imports raise the price 
of protection to the industry lobbies.  Similarly, industries with lower import-
penetration ratios are associated with higher tariffs both because higher tariffs 
reduce imports and because smaller flows of imports lower the price of protection. 
 Prior to GH, several authors offered empirical evidence in support of a 
positive correlation between the import-penetration ratio and the level of protection 
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(e.g., Leamer 1988; Trefler 1993; Lee and Swagel 1996).5  These early empirical 
efforts consisted largely of reduced-form estimations only loosely connected to 
theory.  Importantly, however, through the use of extensive instrumentation, they 
offered evidence on the simultaneity of tariffs and imports, and demonstrated the 
bias inherent in treating either trade policies or trade levels as exogenous.  
Accordingly, this dissertation explicitly addresses the simultaneity problem while 
also grounding the estimating equations firmly in theory.      
 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) 
represent the first attempts to estimate the PFS protection equation using U.S. data.  
Both papers use the NTB coverage ratio at the three-digit level of aggregation as a 
measure of protection, and they use the same data on corporate political 
contributions to classify politically organized and unorganized industries.  They also 
employ many of the industry-level variables appearing in Trefler (1993), including 
measures of market structure, firm concentration and skill composition of employees, 
as instruments for the import-penetration ratio and for the measure of political 
                                                           
5 For example, in Trefler’s (1993) preferred specification, the coefficient on the import-penetration 
ratio is positive in the tariff equation but statistically insignificant while the coefficient on the change 
in the import-penetration ratio is positive and significant. 
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organization.  Notably, although both papers are faithful to GH in their empirical 
specification of the protection equation, the estimating equations for the import-
penetration ratio and political organization are only loosely connected to theory.  
 These two studies differ in their treatment of political contributions: Goldberg 
and Maggi estimate a discrete threshold level of contributions that is then used to 
sort industries into organized and unorganized groups, while Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay include an auxiliary regression of political contributions in an 
attempt to distinguish trade-related contributions which is then used to form the 
organizational dummy.  Another contrast between the two papers involves Gawande 
and Bandyopadhyay’s extension of the model to include a consideration of the role of 
intermediate inputs, an innovation that does not appear in Goldberg and Maggi.  
Finally, these two papers treat the import elasticity differently.  Goldberg and Maggi 
recognize that the import elasticity should be considered an endogenous variable, but 
they are reluctant to specify a separate reduced-form equation.  Instead, they move 
it to the left-hand side in their protection equation, effectively scaling their measure 
of NTBs by the import elasticity.  Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, by contrast, are 
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more concerned with measurement error associated with using previously published 
elasticities.  They estimate a separate error-in-variables equation in order to correct 
the original elasticity numbers from Sheills et al (1985), and then treat the corrected 
estimates as an exogenous regressor. 
 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) present maximum likelihood estimates for the 
coefficients that correspond to equation (1.1).  When an industry is politically 
organized, the coefficient estimate on the import-penetration ratio in their preferred 
specification is -0.0106 with a standard error of 0.0053.  When an industry is not 
politically organized, the coefficient estimate on the import-penetration ratio in their 
preferred specification is 0.0093 with a standard error of 0.0040.  Using these values, 
the implied parameter estimates are 0.883
L
a =  and 0.021α = , corresponding to a 
very high proportion of the population being represented by organized industries and 
a very low weight in the government’s objective function on political contributions. 
 Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) present 2SLS estimates for the 
coefficients that correspond to equation (1.1).  When an industry is politically 
organized, the coefficient estimate on the composite import-penetration 
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ratio/elasticity term in their preferred specification is -3.145 with a standard error of 
1.575.  When an industry is not politically organized, the coefficient estimate on the 
composite import-penetration ratio/elasticity term in their preferred specification is 
3.088 with a standard error of 1.532.  Using these values, the implied parameter 
estimates are 0.981
L
a =  and  0.905α = , corresponding to a very high proportion of 
the population being represented by organized industries and a roughly even 
weighting in the government’s objective function between consumer welfare and 
political contributions. 
 The parameter estimates generated in these two papers, while different in 
important ways, are nevertheless consistent with the PFS predictions: (i) all else 
equal, politically organized industries enjoy higher levels of protection; (ii) the 
relationship between protection and the import-penetration ratio is negative for 
organized industries; and (iii) the relationship between protection and the import-
penetration ratio is positive for unorganized industries. 
 The appeal and tractability of GH’s tariff equation combined with the 
promise of these early results led to many new empirical applications of the PFS 
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framework.  Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Gawande and Krishna (2005) 
extend the model to include intermediate inputs and estimate the tariff equation in 
the presence of upstream and downstream political rivalry.  Eicher and Osang (2002) 
conduct non-nested tests of the PFS tariff equation against a tariff formation 
function in the spirit of Findlay and Wellisz (1992).  They conclude that differences 
in organization rather than differences in contributions are the key determinants of 
protection.  Mitra et al. (2002, 2006) estimate the tariff equation on Turkish data, 
McCalman (2004) examines Australian tariffs, Grether et al. (2001) examines 
protection in Mexico and Belloc (2007) applies the model to trade policy in the E.U.  
Matschkle and Sherlund (2006) study the role of labor unions in the tariff-setting 
process, Facchine et al. (2006) apply the model to quota protection while Kee et al. 
(2005) and Gawande and Krishna (2005) investigate foreign lobbying.  Each of these 
extensions of the PFS framework provides empirical evidence that is generally 
supportive of GH’s main predictions: organization matters, and among organized 
industries, there is a negative correlation between import-penetration and protection.   
22 
 
 Although now firmly entrenched as the dominant paradigm, the PFS 
framework is not without its critics.  Indeed, as the model is extended in new ways, 
some anomalies grow in prominence.  For example, although the coefficient estimates 
in most applications are consistent with the predictions of the model, the implied 
parameter values for the political weights and proportion of the population that is 
organized seem unrealistic and at times contradictory.  That is, the coefficient 
estimates often suggest that a large proportion of the population is organized, yet 
the estimated weight on political contributions is rather small.  Empirical work 
contemporaneous with the time period studied by GM and GB suggests that the 
deadweight losses due to trade policy were considerably larger than total political 
contributions, leading to the expectation that the government weighs contributions 
quite heavily (see Hufbauer et al., 1986 and Stern, 1988).6  
 A second example concerns the distinction between organized and 
unorganized industries.  The methodologies used to delineate these two categories 
have come under heavy criticism and classification errors involving such a crucial 
                                                           
6 Gawande and Krishna (2003) and Mitra et al. (2006) elaborate on this point. 
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explanatory variable may be responsible for some of the confusing parameter 
estimates mentioned above.  Imai et al. (2008a, 2008b) offer just such a critique, 
arguing that the PFS model conditions the structural relationship between industry-
level characteristics and political contributions, though most empirical applications 
ignore this restriction.  Specifically, political contributions are endogenous to the 
model—some industries that are organized may nevertheless choose small 
contribution levels.  In this case, it is a mistake to classify such an industry as 
“unorganized.”  Imai et al. (2008c) offer a quantile-based test of the PFS predictions 
that does not depend on classification according to political organization.  Contrary 
to the results offered by GM and GB, they find a positive relationship between the 
import-penetration ratio and trade protection; a result more consistent with the pre-
GH empirical literature mentioned above. 
 Mitra et al. (2006) are similarly troubled by the (mis-)classification of 
industries according to political organization.  They approach the problem by 
experimenting with the PFS protection equation assuming all industries that receive 
positive protection and/or make political contributions are politically organized.  
24 
 
This specification limits the degrees of freedom such that the authors must estimate 
α  given 
L
a  (or vice versa).  Nevertheless, they are able to generate parameter 
combinations that are much more “reasonable” using U.S. and Turkish data—that 
is, if the population is assumed to be highly mobilized and organized, then the 
parameter estimate for the lobby weight is also high, while if the population is 
assumed to be mostly unorganized, then the lobby weight is correspondingly low. 
 This recognition of the endogenous nature of political organization and 
contributions shifts our focus onto industry-level characteristics that might 
simultaneously determine political activity, trade levels and trade policies.  Trefler 
(1993) included concentration ratios, median firm scale and a Herfindahl measure in 
his approach to endogenous tariffs, appealing to Olson’s (1965) familiar collective 
action logic.  These same variables are often included as instruments in many of the 
empirical applications mentioned above, though their theoretical importance remains 
unexamined.  Indeed, although the size and structure of industries are surely 
correlated with (average) productivity, productivity differences are relegated to the 
error term in the PFS framework.  As a result, these variables appear to be poor 
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instruments, and the absence of theory renders the interpretation of coefficients on 
these variables problematic. 
 Karacaovali (2006) is a distinctive article that addresses the endogenous 
relationship between trade policy and industry productivity.  He is concerned about 
the widespread practice of treating trade policies as exogenous when examining their 
effect on average productivities.  Karacaovali modifies the PFS framework to 
accommodate differences in total factor productivity and derives a tariff equation 
that predicts higher tariffs for industries with higher TFP.  The logic is simple—the 
marginal benefit of protective trade policies is higher when it applies to more output 
and more productive processes.  He examines this relationship empirically in the 
context of Colombian trade reforms and is able to show that during an economy-
wide liberalization, sectors with higher productivities continue to enjoy relatively 
higher levels of protection, and sectors with greater increases in productivity have 
lower reductions in tariffs.  His results demonstrate that the endogenous relationship 
between trade policy and productivity serves to strengthen the impact of trade 
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liberalization on average productivities, implying that studies treating trade policy as 
exogenously determined are systematically underestimating this effect. 
 One important avenue for connecting industry-level characteristics to trade 
policy is to extend and elaborate the process of lobby formation.  Mitra (1999) offers 
a formal treatment of this process.  When political organization (lobby formation) is 
subject to fixed costs, then firms must balance the benefits of organization against 
the costs of joining the lobby.  Accordingly, changes in trade policies alter the 
incentives facing firms and so affect the number of organized industries in 
equilibrium.  When considering the effect of industry-level characteristics, Mitra 
illustrates that high capital stocks, low demand elasticities, less geographic dispersion 
and fewer members all raise the net benefit of organizing and hence raise the 
probability of lobby formation. 
 Bombardini (2008) further extends this lobby-formation framework to a 
model with heterogeneous firms.  Again, fixed costs of organization drive the result—
larger firms find it more advantageous to pay to form lobbies, so the model predicts 
that industries populated by a higher share of larger firms are more likely to engage 
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in political activity.  Bombardini also provides empirical evidence in support of this 
prediction—industries characterized by a larger proportion of relatively large firms 
ultimately receive higher levels of protection. 
 In summary, the existing literature devoted to extending and testing the PFS 
framework consists of numerous successful applications of the tariff equation that 
generate empirical support for GH’s key prediction—that there is a negative 
correlation between the import-penetration ratio and the level of protection among 
politically organized industries.  This finding seems to be at odds with empirical 
work outside of the PFS tradition that finds a weak positive relationship between 
the level of imports and the level of protection.  Yet these two findings are not 
mutually contradictory.  Within the PFS model, an exogenous shock to imports will 
trigger the expected increase in political contributions by an organized industry in 
the pursuit of a higher tariff.  Hence the demand for protection exhibits a positive 
relationship between imports and tariffs.  However, the higher tariff in turn lowers 
the import-penetration ratio and raises the welfare cost to the government thereby 
generating the observed negative correlation in equilibrium. 
28 
 
 Yet this is a discussion about effects.  The central question remains: How and 
why does the constellation of the level of protection, the level of import-penetration 
and the level of political contributions differ across industries?  What are the causes, 
or put differently, what are the relevant sources of exogenous variation?  For all its 
creativity and inventiveness, the original PFS framework is too simple to offer us the 
opportunity to explore the necessary counterfactual scenarios.  Other researchers 
have recognized this shortcoming with respect to the political apparatus, extending 
and improving our understanding of political organization and lobby formation.  
This dissertation addresses the simplicity of the underlying economic model by 
offering a new perspective on the sources of industry heterogeneity and the 
consequences for political contributions, trade policy and trade flows. 
 We offer two broad contributions to the literature.  In chapter 2 we construct 
a new model of endogenous trade policy using a richer and more sophisticated theory 
of trade than has been employed in the past.  The vast majority of the literature 
uses either the Heckscher-Ohlin or Ricardo-Viner (specific factors) model of trade.  
By contrast, we employ a “new-new” model of trade, characterized by imperfect 
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competition and heterogeneous firms.  As a result, our model generates industries 
that differ in their vulnerability to foreign competition and hence in their demand for 
protection.  This is not due to exogenous differences in political organization as 
appears in the original PFS framework.  Rather, it is due to more fundamental 
industry characteristics—in particular, variation in natural barriers to trade.  By 
natural barriers to trade, we mean the fixed costs associated with entering new 
markets and engaging in trade across national borders. 
 In chapter 3 we offer a structural estimation of the model’s key parameters.  
Unlike much of the previous empirical research that is only loosely connected to 
theory, our estimating equations are derived directly from the theoretical model.  We 
successfully employ an empirical methodology—indirect inference—that is new to the 
fields of international trade and political economy and that is well-suited for dealing 
with the many complex endogenous relationships that characterize the model.  
Finally, our estimation results speak directly to two of the important issues 
mentioned in the above review.  First, using the same indicator of political 
organization employed in previous studies, we show that there is no significant 
30 
 
distinction between these two subgroups of industries, suggesting that the 
explanatory power that has been previously attributed to this variable is misplaced.  
Second, we estimate the relative weight the government places on the political 
contributions of import-competing interests when setting trade policy and show that 
it substantively and significantly differs from previously published results.    
 
     
   
  
      
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORY 
 
 
The “Protection for Sale” (PFS) literature has long considered industry-level 
characteristics to be important for the endogenous determination of trade policy, yet 
the parsimony of the PFS framework has left much of the associated empirical work 
open to criticism.1  There is growing recognition that trade policy, trade levels, 
political activity and industrial organization are all simultaneously determined, but 
the simple economic model underlying the existing PFS framework—a small, open 
economy populated by identical, perfectly competitive firms that produce 
homogeneous goods for either domestic consumption or export, but never both—is 
not equipped to handle so many endogenous variables in a satisfactory manner.  In 
this chapter we marry the PFS political architecture to an economic model adapted 
from Melitz (2003) featuring a small, open economy populated by heterogeneous 
                                                           
1 See chapter 1 for details. 
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firms producing differentiated goods for (possibly) multiple monopolistically 
competitive markets.  Importantly, the model simultaneously determines the level of 
imports, the level of trade protection, the level of political contributions and the 
industrial organization of each industry as a function of consumer preferences, the 
distribution of production technology and fixed costs of trade. 
The crux of the model is the simultaneous existence of ‘natural’ barriers to 
trade and trade policy, where industries faced with low levels of natural protection 
pursue high levels of policy protection in equilibrium, and vice versa.  This effect is 
shown to operate in both small- and large-country versions of the model.  The result 
drives other important comparative static effects, including a nonmonotonic 
relationship between the equilibrium levels of the import-penetration ratio and policy 
protection.   As a result, this chapter offers a new explanation for the coincident 
observations of both positive and negative correlations between imports and 
protection.  Rather than being based on differences in political organization, we 
argue that this nonmonotonic relationship is driven by industry-level variation in 
natural barriers to trade. 
33 
 
Model Preliminaries 
We begin with a small, open economy with population L.2  Two types of 
goods are produced and consumed: a homogeneous good (sector j = 0) and M 
differentiated-goods sectors indexed by j.  Each differentiated sector consists of a 
continuum of firms of mass N producing varieties indexed by i.  Consumers have 
utility 
 
1
0 0 1
U( , ) ln[ ]; ( ) ( )
j
Mc c c j c
ij j j j c ijj
q q q D D N q di
χ γ
γσµ
−
= Ω
  = + =   
∑ ∫  (2.1) 
where 
0
cq  is individual consumption of the homogenous good and c
ij
q  is individual 
consumption of variety i in sector j.  Let 
j
Ω  represent the subset of available 
varieties in sector j that the individual consumes.  The parameter 
j
µ  measures the 
intensity of preferences for goods in sector j relative to all other sectors; in 
equilibrium, 
j
µ
 
equals total expenditures on all varieties in sector j by an individual.  
The parameter σ  is the elasticity of substitution among varieties, where 1σ
σ
γ −=  and 
                                                           
2 The precise meaning of a small-country assumption is not altogether obvious in models of this type.  
We follow Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) in assuming that small-country actors (including the 
government) take foreign demand and foreign entry as given. 
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1σ > .  Quasi-linear utility guarantees no income effects, and each sector enters 
utility in a symmetric fashion with no cross-sector effects.  This is a CES utility 
function, but the inclusion of the j
c
N  term generalizes the love-of-variety feature.  As 
explained in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007), the parameter χ  measures the 
intensity of preference for variety.  Most users of CES utility functions assume 0χ =
, implying consumers have an unbounded love of variety.  As a result, optimal trade 
policy would need to balance the ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ variety effects against other welfare 
effects.  Here, we assume 1χ=  thereby neutralizing the love-of-variety feature.  
Consequently, just as in the PFS paradigm, governments will not target variety 
when setting policy. 
 Individuals draw income from three sources.  First, each individual is 
endowed with one unit of labor that generates w.  Second, all tariff revenues (TR) 
are redistributed equally across all individuals in the population.  Third, each 
individual is endowed with one unit of generic capital.  Consequently, the individual 
budget constraint can be written as 
 
0 0 1
j
Mc c
ij ij ijj
TR
w q p q p di
L
π
= Ω
+ + = +∑ ∫ . (2.2) 
35 
 
Maximization of (2.1) subject to (2.2) and multiplying by L yields the familiar CES 
aggregate demand function for any variety 
 
ij 1
q ( ) j
ij ij
j
E
p p
P
σ
σ
−
−
=  (2.3) 
where 
j j
E Lµ=  is aggregate expenditure on all varieties in sector j and 1
j
P σ−  is the 
price index in sector j.  Substituting (2.3) and (2.2) into (2.1) gives the expression 
for indirect utility 
 
1
V( , ) (ln[ ] 1)
M
ij ij j jj
TR
p I w D
L
π µ
=
= + + + −∑ . (2.4) 
  The homogeneous good (numeraire) is produced under perfect competition, 
constant returns with unit labor costs and is freely traded, pinning down wages 
across all sectors at 1w = .  All firms in the differentiated sectors require a fixed 
start-up cost of j
e
f  units of capital.  Individuals have a choice as to where to invest 
their capital endowment.  They can invest it in a risk-free asset that generates zero 
excess return.  In this case individuals are guaranteed to be able to consume their 
entire capital endowment.  Alternatively they can use it to start a firm in one of 
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several differentiated-goods sectors.  In this case individuals are entitled to all 
operating profits.  Once the capital is invested in a start-up, the individual (firm 
owner) draws a blueprint for a variety that is tied to a specific productivity.  If the 
firm owner draws a high productivity (low marginal cost), he/she will be able to 
compete in one or more markets, generating positive operating profits and hence a 
nonzero excess return on the investment.  On the other hand, if the firm owner 
draws a low productivity (high marginal cost), he/she will not be able to compete in 
any markets—this firm shuts down and the firm owner loses his/her capital 
investment.  We assume the risk-free asset generates zero excess return, 0r =ɶ .  Each 
successful firm will generate a different level of sales and profits, so the return to 
capital will vary across firms, 0
i
r > , while a firm failure will cost the entire capital 
investment, 1
i
r = − . 
 We further assume a large enough population to ensure perfectly elastic 
supplies of labor and capital.  This gives the model a strong partial-equilibrium 
appearance: factor supplies have no effect on factor returns, and relative factor 
supplies have no effect on trade.  Nevertheless, the monopolistically competitive 
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markets generate endogenously determined returns to capital, and free entry implies 
that the expected return to capital in any differentiated sector is 1 r+ ɶ .  In 
equilibrium, investing in a start-up firm in any sector should be just as attractive, 
but no more attractive, than investing in a start-up firm in any other sector or 
investing capital in the risk-free asset. 
 Following Melitz (2003), we assume the productivities are distributed Pareto 
such that the marginal costs c are drawn from 
 G( ) [0, ]
c
c c c
c
κ
κ
= ∈ , (2.5) 
where c  is the scale parameter (upper bound) and κ  is the shape parameter.  Firms 
are heterogeneous in the sense that they have different marginal costs associated 
with producing different varieties.  Hence i indexes firms and varieties, and we can 
write marginal costs as a one-to-one function of varieties, ( )
i
c i c= . 
 Profits for the firm in sector j producing variety i with cost c are 
 
,
, , , , , , , ,q ( )( ) q ( )( )
i j
i j i j i j i j i j i j j i j i j jX
H X H H H i X X ij j
X X
p
p p c f p c Fπ π π
τ ψ
= + = − − + − − . (2.6) 
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Firm owners receive all gross profits from domestic sales, 
H
π , and all gross profits 
from foreign sales, 
X
π .  All home firms selling in the domestic market must pay a 
fixed market-entry cost of 0jf >  units of labor.  Selling in the foreign market 
involves an additional set of variable and fixed costs.  All home firms selling in the 
foreign market must pay a fixed market-entry cost of 0j jF f> >  units of labor, and 
all exports face an ad-valorem tariff 1 j j
X X
t τ+ =  and iceberg transportation costs 
1 j j
X X
s ψ+ = .  Note that these fixed market-entry costs, tariffs and transport costs 
are sector-specific, but common across all firms within a sector. 
Firms maximizing profits set constant markups and charge prices 
 , ,
j j
i j i ji i X X
H X
c c
p p
τ ψ
γ γ
= = . (2.7) 
Consequently, the quantity sold, the revenues and the gross profits from selling in 
the domestic market are, respectively, 
 
1 ,
, , ,
1 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
j j i j
i j i j i j jH i H i H
H H Hj j
H H
E c E c r
q r f
σ σ
σ σ
γ
π
σ
− −
− −
= = = −
∆ ∆
, (2.8) 
where, 
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 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) G( ) ( ) ( ) G( )
j j
HH FH
j j j
H F F
N N
c d c c d cσ σ σ στ ψ− − − −∆ = +∫ ∫ . (2.9) 
The integrals in (2.9) are defined over the number of home firms that successfully 
compete in the home market, j
HH
N , and the number of foreign firms that successfully 
export to the home market, j
FH
N .  They are subsets of the total number of firms 
that enter each market, j
H
N  and j
F
N , such that G( )j j j
HH H H
N N c=  and 
G( )j j j
FH F F
N N c= .  Using this notation, we can write the extensive margin of trade—
the number of different varieties enjoyed by consumers in the home market—as 
j j j
C HH FH
N N N= + .   Analogously, the number of home firms that successfully export 
to the foreign country, j
HX
N , is also a subset of the total number of firms entering 
the home market, ( )j j j
HX H X
N N G c= .  The quantity exported to the foreign market, 
the revenues and the gross profits from exporting are, respectively, 
 
,
, , 1 ,( ) ( )
i j
i j j j i j j j i j jX
X i X X X i X X X j j
X X
r
q c r c Fσ στ ψ τ ψ π
στ ψ
− −= Γ = Γ = − . (2.10) 
The Γ  in these expressions is a consequence of the small-country assumption.  It 
represents an exogenous demand shifter that corresponds to the demand for the 
home country’s exports in foreign markets. 
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 The small country assumption also assures that changes in the home country 
will not affect entry decision in the foreign country, hence the total number of 
foreign firms, j
F
N , is exogenous to the model.  Foreign firms seeking to export to the 
home market are assumed to have a similar production and cost structure as home 
firms.   Specifically, they are heterogeneous with respect to their marginal costs and 
they must also pay symmetric fixed market-entry costs jF , as well as tariffs j
F
τ  and 
transport costs j
F
ψ .  As a result, the quantities, prices, revenues and profits of 
foreign firms are, respectively, 
 
, ,
1
1 ,
, ,
1
( )
( )
( )
( )
j j j j j
i j i jH i F F i F F
F Fj
H
j j j i j
i j i j jH i F F F
F Fj j j
H F F
E c c
q p
E c r
r F
σ
σ
σ
σ
γ τ ψ τ ψ
γ
τ ψ
π
στ ψ
−
−
−
−
= =
∆
= = −
∆
. (2.11) 
Setting 0j
H
π =  defines a cutoff value for the marginal cost in sector j, j
H
c , and 
setting 0j
X
π =  defines a second cutoff value, j
X
c .  Thus, firms in the home country 
are sorted into three types: those that draw marginal costs in the range [0, ]j
X
c  will 
successfully export and sell in the domestic market, while firms drawing marginal 
costs in the range ( , ]j j
X H
c c  will sell only in the domestic market, and firms with 
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marginal costs in the range ( , ]j
H
c c  shut down prior to any production.  In addition, 
foreign firms selling in the home market are also subject to this sorting process.  
Setting  0j
F
π =  defines a cutoff value j
F
c  for foreign marginal costs such that any 
foreign firm with marginal costs in the range [0, ]j
F
c  will successfully sell in the home 
market.  Using the expressions for gross profits, these cutoffs can be written as 
 
1
1
1
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( ) ( )
( )
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 (2.12) 
 Let j
H
R  and j
F
R  represent the total value of domestic sales and imports in 
sector j such that j j
H j H H F
L E R Rµ = = + , while j
X
R  represents the total value of 
exports in sector j.  Then we can write 
 
1
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 (2.13) 
where we assume ( 1) 0κ σ− + >  as a regularity condition.  This condition effectively 
places an upper bound on the elasticity of substitution σ  that depends directly on 
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the value of the shape parameter for the Pareto distribution κ : the greater the skew 
in the distribution of firms, the larger the range of permissible substitution 
elasticities.  Using (2.12) and (2.13) we can further define the import-penetration 
ratio for sector j in the home country as3 
 
j j j j j
j F FF F F
j
H jH
R N F
Z
LE
τ ψ
µ
= = . (2.14) 
 Let E[ ]j
H
π  and E[ ]j
X
π  represent the expected gross profits of home firms from 
selling in the domestic and foreign markets, respectively.  Then the expected return 
on capital invested in sector j in the home country is 
E[ ] G( )E[ ] G( )E[ ].j j j j j
H H X X
c cπ π π= +
  
Using (2.8) - (2.12) we can write 
 
0
0
1
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 (2.15)
Free entry in each sector and the assumption of a risk-free outside option guarantees 
                                                           
3 In the standard PFS models the import-penetration ratio is written as the ratio of imports to 
domestic output.  Here it is the ratio of imports to total expenditure in that sector.  In any case, 
1
j j
FF
j j
HH
Z R
Z R−
= . 
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that the expected excess return to any unit of capital equals zero.  Using (2.15) this 
condition becomes 
 
1 1
G( ) G( )
1 1
j j j j j
H X e
c f c F f
σ σ
κ σ κ σ
− −
+ =
− + − +
. (2.16) 
The Effects of Exogenous Trade Barriers 
Having spelled out the details of the economy, featuring heterogeneous firms, 
free entry, variable trade costs and fixed trade costs, it is instructive to review the 
comparative static effects of an exogenous rise or fall in barriers to trade.  That is, 
this section demonstrates the economic effects in the absence of politics, so as to 
establish the similarity of our model to that of the contemporary trade literature.  
These results will then be useful reference points against which to compare results 
from the full model with endogenous trade policy.  The two exogenous changes of 
interest are (i) a rise or fall in the composite of the two variable trade costs facing 
importers j j
F F
τ ψ , and (ii) a rise or fall in the fixed costs of trade, jF .  To ease 
notation, we will drop the sector superscript j and refer to the composite of the 
variable trade costs as Θ .  In addition, the functional forms we have adopted lend 
themselves to the calculation and interpretation of elasticities when presenting 
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comparative static effects.  Let x
y
ε  denote the ratio of the percentage change in x to 
the percentage change in y.  Then we define all elasticities below in the usual way 
y
x
dy x
dx y
ε = . 
Claim 1: An increase in the variable trade cost composite Θ  leads to a fall in 
the import-penetration ratio, 0ZεΘ < .  This effect appears along the intensive margin 
as foreign firms reduce the quantity of exports to the home country, 0F
q
εΘ < , and it 
appears along the extensive margin as fewer foreign firms are able to compete in the 
home market, 0.FF
N
εΘ <   (See appendix B for Proof). 
 This is a standard result in most heterogeneous-firms models and can be 
brought about by a change in either the tariff or the transportation cost.  The effect 
is monotonic—if variable trade costs continue to rise, the level of trade will 
eventually reach a point of prohibition (no trade).  Similarly, if variable trade costs 
continue to fall, the level of trade will eventually reach its maximum at the free-
trade solution 1Θ = . 
 The effect of the tariff on relative prices has real effects that mirror those in 
standard trade models.  For example, consider two firms i = 1, 2 in a given industry 
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j that are identical except that firm 1 is a home firm and firm 2 is a foreign firm.  In 
the absence of any trade barriers these two firms would charge the same prices and 
sell the same quantities.  Introducing a positive tariff 1τ >  on foreign goods causes 
the foreign firm to raise its price by the entire value of the tariff (see equation (2.11)
) while the home firm keeps its price constant due to the constant markup nature of 
pricing (see equation (2.7)).  As a result, the relative price of firm 2 to firm 1 is 
given by the value of the tariff, 2
1
p
p
τ= .  Consumers respond to the increase in the 
relative price of good 2 by substituting away from it, 2 0
dq
dτ
< , and towards more 
home varieties such as good 1, 1 0
dq
dτ
> .  The average price across all goods in the 
consumption bundle also rises, causing the consumer to enjoy a smaller aggregate 
quantity of goods for the same level of aggregate expenditure.  The consumer’s 
expenditure share on goods in sector j is constant by assumption, so the only 
expenditure switching that takes place is between different varieties within the same 
sector. 
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 On the production side the home firm (1) increases its total sales at the same 
price and margin and so raises its level of profits, 1 0
d
d
π
τ
> .  Moreover, some 
previously noncompetitive home firms will find that they can now compete 
successfully in the home market as a result of the tariff, and the increased 
profitability of home firms will induce entry in the form of more individuals paying 
the start-up cost.  By contrast, the foreign firm (2) finds that its sales and profits 
are both reduced, 2 0
d
d
π
τ
< , representing a decrease in trade along the intensive 
margin.  In addition, some foreign firms will find that they are no longer able to 
successfully compete in the home market and so will exit the market, representing a 
decrease in trade along the extensive margin. 
 Claim 2: An increase in the fixed cost of trade leads to a fall in the import-
penetration ratio, 0Z
F
ε < .  This effect is the result of a fall in trade along the 
extensive margin, 0FFN
F
ε < , that outweighs the increase in trade along the intensive 
margin, 0Fq
F
ε > . (See appendix B for Proof). 
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 In this case a rise in the fixed costs facing foreign firms reduces the number of 
viable importers.  As a result, all remaining firms (home and foreign) increase their 
quantity supplied to the home market to make up for the lost foreign varieties.  This 
in turn induces entry by new home firms, with the result that the sector is now 
composed of a larger number of home firms, each producing a larger quantity of 
goods than before, and a smaller number of foreign firms, each producing a larger 
quantity of goods than before.  The net effect is an unambiguous and monotonic fall 
in the import-penetration ratio—the higher fixed cost shifts market share to home 
firms. 
Endogenous Tariffs 
 We turn now to the endogenous determination of tariffs.  The preceding 
model must be modified to include a single policy maker (the government) that sets 
the tariff in each sector and sector-specific lobbies that use the joint profits of all 
firms in a sector to ‘purchase’ protection.  In this version of the model, firms again 
face three kinds of barriers—two are ‘natural’ in the sense that they are exogenous 
(the transport cost 
F
ψ  and the fixed cost F), while the third is subject to 
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manipulation by the policy maker (the tariff τ ).  As we explain below, the extent of 
natural barriers within a sector serves to influence the cost-benefit analysis of its 
lobby when determining what level of protection to purchase.  
 Social welfare in the home country is the aggregated version of (2.4) and takes 
the form 
 1
1
1 1 1
V( , )
[ ] ln[( ) ] 1 .
ij
M M M jj j j
H j HF jj j j
H
SW L p I
L TR L E L N σ
γµ
π µ −
= = =
=
  = + + + −   ∆ 
∑ ∑ ∑
 (2.17) 
As in the original PFS framework, we assume the existence of sector-specific lobbies 
that represent all operating firms within a sector.  GH posited that some sectors 
successfully organize while others do not, and the key prediction of their model is 
built on this exogenous distinction.  By contrast, we assume all industries 
successfully organize and offer political contributions in exchange for tariff 
protection.  The level of contributions is therefore an endogenous outcome 
determined in equilibrium.  We adopt this assumption for two reasons.  First, we 
prefer to let the model determine which industries have the strongest incentives to 
make political contributions rather than arbitrarily denoting some industries as 
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‘unorganized.’  Indeed, some industries may in the limit choose to make zero political 
contributions and so mimic an ‘unorganized’ industry.  Second, in the data used in 
chapter 3, all industries are observed to make nonzero PAC contributions.  
Accordingly, we prefer to model the variation across contributions, rather than to 
automatically associate low contributions with a lack of political organization.  
 A more comprehensive approach would endogenize both the decision to 
organize and the size of the political contribution, conditional on successful 
organization.  For example, suppose there was some threshold cost of organization 
that would serve to delineate organized and unorganized industries.  This 
configuration would then give rise to a coordination game among individual firms 
within each industry.  Each firm would have to decide how much it would be willing 
to contribute towards the formation of a lobby based on its expected benefits from 
the lobby’s political activities and contributions.  However, each firm would also 
have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of the remaining firms because the 
benefits of the tariff cannot be limited to contributors.  Thus each firm’s optimal 
strategy would depend not only on expected benefits of the tariff, but also on the 
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expected contributions of its peer firms.  This game can become quite complicated, 
as we would not expect a symmetric equilibrium in industries populated by 
heterogeneous firms.  In other words, industrial organization (average firm size, 
dispersion of firm sizes, market concentration, etc.,) would be expected to influence 
political organization and contributions, and at the same time the resulting tariffs 
would influence industrial organization.  Mitra (1999) and Bombardini (2008) are 
two examples of efforts to formalize this process.  We discuss extensions to the 
present model along these lines in chapter 4.    
 Lobbies set truthful contribution schedules taking the form 
 PC ( ) ( ) ,j j j j j
F F
Bτ τ= Π −   (2.18) 
where jΠ  represents the total profits earned by all operating firms in industry j in 
the home country and jB  is a constant determined in equilibrium.  Hence the 
political contributions used to purchase protection are simply some portion of total 
industry profits.  Lobbies do not care about consumer prices as they perceive their 
sector to be too small to have appreciable effects in the aggregate—this is the “ice-
cream clause” as noted in Baldwin (2006); it corresponds to example 3 in GH.  This 
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specification removes any rivalry from the industry lobbies, and it implies that they 
need only contribute just enough to satisfy the government’s participation 
constraint.  Specifically, the lobbies set their B’s such that the government is just 
indifferent between the equilibrium outcome that would emerge in the absence of the 
lobby and the equilibrium outcome with the preferred tariff. 
Note the contribution schedule reflects the benefits of high home tariffs on 
foreign imports.  Further, note that a change in tariffs affects the profits of all 
existing firms and, by altering the cost cutoffs, influences entry and selection into 
markets.  Combining (2.16) and the simplifying assumption 1j
e
f =  for all j lets us 
write 
 ( ) ( )j j j j
F H F
Nτ τΠ =  (2.19) 
The important point here is that the effect of the tariff on total industry profits, and 
therefore on political contributions, runs parallel to the effect of the tariff on entry.  
Moreover, any other exogenous change that induces new firms to enter the industry 
will also raise total industry profits. 
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A government that accepts political contributions in the fashion above 
chooses tariffs to maximize a weighted political support function where α  is the 
relative weight placed on political contributions from any sector.  When 0α =  the 
government does not value political contributions, when 1α =  the government 
values political contributions on an equal basis with consumer welfare, and when 
1α >  the government values political contributions relatively more than consumer 
welfare.  The quasi-linear utility function and partial-equilibrium nature of this 
model permits the government to set tariffs sector by sector without any spillover 
effects.  Thus, for any sector j, the government’s problem takes the form 
 { }max SW( ) ( )PC ( ) s.t. 1
j
F
j j j j
F F F
τ
τ α τ τ+ ≥ . (2.20) 
Note that the wage is independent of any sector’s tariff and the expected return to 
capital is determined by the free-entry condition.  The government does not observe 
each individual’s capital return, but knows that on average the excess return is zero 
for all values of the tariff.  Consequently, from the government’s perspective, the 
only components of social welfare that are functions of the tariff are the redistributed 
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tariff revenue and consumer surplus (through the price index).  This results in first-
order conditions for each sector j that take the form4 
 
( )11 ( )( )
( ) 0
1
j
HF
j
H
N
j j j
j H H
j j j j
HF F F F
dL dTR dN
N d d d
σ
σµ
α
σ τ τ τ
−− ∆∆
+ + ≤
−
. (2.21) 
The first term on the left-hand side captures the effect of the home tariff on 
consumer surplus.  In this model, with the love-of-variety effect neutralized, 
consumer surplus unambiguously falls with a rise in the home tariff.  This is because 
consumers only care about the average price in each industry--and tariffs raise 
average prices.  The second term on the left-hand side captures the effect of the 
home tariff on tariff revenue in each industry.  This term follows a typical pattern—
for very low levels of the tariff, incremental increases will increase tariff revenue, 
while for high levels of the tariff, incremental increases will decrease tariff revenue.  
The third term on the left-hand side captures the effect of the home tariff on 
                                                           
4 The first-order conditions will equal zero for any nonzero equilibrium tariff.  If the constraint binds, 
1j
H
τ = , then the conditions may not be satisfied as a strict equality.   
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political contributions via total industry profits.  This term is always positive—a 
higher home tariff raises the profitability of home firms and encourages entry.5 
The complexity of this model requires that some of the parameters be 
restricted so that we can focus attention on interior solutions.  For example, a 
trading equilibrium featuring incomplete specialization requires positive demand for 
the homogeneous good at home and abroad.  This requirement effectively restricts 
the value of 
j
µ  for each sector (or rather, the sum across sectors).  That is, there is 
an upper bound on 
1
M
jj
µ
=∑  so that consumers do not spend all of their income on 
the differentiated products.  Similarly, there is a lower bound on the fixed cost of 
domestic market entry, jf , such that the domestic cost cutoff, j
H
c , does not coincide 
with the upper limit of the cost distribution.  The implication would be that all 
entering firms would be successful in this industry, effectively violating the free-entry 
condition. 
 
 
                                                           
5 The uniqueness of the optimal tariff is guaranteed by the concavity of the government’s objective 
function.  This feature is demonstrated numerically in appendix A. 
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Comparative Statics of Endogenous Tariffs 
 In particular, we are most interested in the comparative static effects of 
variation in the fixed costs of trade F .  We focus attention on fixed costs for two 
key reasons.  First, fixed costs play a crucial role in the literature relating firm 
heterogeneity to trade flows and trade volumes (e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1999, 2001; 
Tybout 2003; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004), yet they are entirely absent from 
the literature on endogenous tariffs.  By the fixed costs of trade we mean the fixed 
costs associated with entering a new market.  These can involve the costs associated 
with modifying domestic models for foreign tastes, adapting packaging for foreign 
markets, minimum freight and insurance charges, and constructing and maintaining 
marketing, distribution and service networks for a foreign clientele.  These fixed 
costs of trade might also reflect information costs associated with learning about 
foreign demand as well as mastering and monitoring foreign bureaucratic procedures 
relating to customs, product standards and the enforcement of contracts.  These 
costs can be substantial—in a detailed study of the Colombian chemicals industry, 
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Das, Roberts and Tybout (2001) generate estimates for the firm-level cost of entering 
foreign markets that range from $730,000 to $1.6 million. 
 Second, in models of the type considered here, fixed costs affect all of the 
endogenous variables of interest—trade, tariff lobbying and industry-level 
productivity measures—and so offer a truly exogenous source of variation across 
industries.  The higher is the fixed cost of trade for any sector j, the more costly it is 
to enter the foreign market relative to entering the domestic market.  This is a 
“natural” barrier to trade in the sense that it is not the direct outcome of a 
government policy decision and is therefore not susceptible to the usual channels of 
political influence.  Consequently, whether and to what extent firms and industries 
operate behind high natural barriers influences how they weigh the costs and benefits 
of lobbying for trade protection.  
 Claim 3: An increase in the fixed cost of trade leads to a fall in the 
equilibrium tariff, 0
F
τε < .  Sectors that face increased import competition via a fall 
in a natural barrier to trade turn to the government and purchase tariff protection 
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as a substitute.  This effect is illustrated in figure 2.1.6  (See appendix C for further 
numerical demonstrations). 
 Sectors which are already shielded from import competition in the form of a 
high F find the gains from tariff protection to be especially expensive—the marginal 
benefits (in the form of higher industry profits) are small while the government 
requires a large compensating contribution to offset further restriction of trade.  By 
contrast, sectors with low F face much greater competition from foreign firms.  
These sectors have more to gain from marginal increases in tariff protection, and the 
government requires a relatively smaller contribution to enact the tariff.  The net 
result is that the equilibrium home tariff is monotonically decreasing in F. 
 This result is not typical in the contemporary trade literature.  In Melitz-style 
models, the effects of changes in variable trade costs are completely independent of 
the effects of changes in fixed trade costs.  By contrast, in combining the model of 
trade with a model of endogenous protection, we have transformed the variable trade 
                                                           
6 All figures in this chapter were generated by solving the model numerically and then varying the 
natural barrier to trade F.  The parameters were set to 3.9, 3.5, 1, 1, 1, 1
e
c f fσ κ α= = = = = =  
and the exogenous variables were set to 500, 5000, 100
f
N E X= = = .  
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cost into an endogenous variable.  Accordingly, claim 3 specifies the nature of the 
effect of changes in the fixed trade cost on the equilibrium value of the variable 
trade cost. 
   
 
Figure 2.1 
 We next consider the relationship between the fixed cost of trade and the 
import-penetration ratio.  This involves two conflicting effects—an increase in the 
fixed cost of trade reduces the level of imports, but as explained above it also raises 
the ‘price’ of tariff protection resulting in a lower equilibrium tariff.  The net effect 
on the import-penetration ratio can be positive or negative, depending on the 
current level of the fixed trade cost. 
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 Claim 4: An increase in the fixed cost of trade will lead to an increase in the 
import-penetration ratio, 0Z
F
ε > , for relatively low values of F—specifically, over 
that range of F for which the intensive-margin effect outweighs the extensive-margin 
effect,  .FFNqF
F F
ε ε>   Conversely, an increase in the fixed cost of trade will lead to a 
decrease in the import-penetration ratio, 0Z
F
ε < , for relatively high values of F—
specifically, over that range of F for which the extensive-margin effect outweighs the 
intensive-margin effect, .FFNqF
F F
ε ε<   This effect is illustrated in figure 2.2.  (See 
appendix C for further numerical demonstrations.) 
 The relationship between the import-penetration ratio and F is nonmonotonic.  
When the extent of natural barriers is already high, an exogenous shock that 
increases imports (such as a fall in the natural barrier) triggers increased sectoral 
lobbying for tariffs.  But restoring the prior level of imports requires a tariff level 
whose marginal cost, in the form of greater political contributions, outweigh the 
marginal benefits for total industry profits.  This is because trade is already low to 
begin with—a further reduction has little impact on market share or profits, but a 
marginal increase in trade matters to consumers (and therefore the government) 
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relatively more.  The result is that an industry that enjoys high natural barriers to 
trade effectively “accommodates” the import shock by allowing the equilibrium level 
of the import-penetration ratio rise.   
 By contrast, when the extent of natural barriers is already low, an exogenous 
shock that increases imports (such as a further fall in the natural barrier) again 
triggers new sectoral lobbying.  In this case, however, the marginal benefits of the 
tariff to the lobby exceed the marginal costs in the form of political contributions 
required to compensate the government.  As a result, the lobby “purchases” a tariff 
level that is even higher than the level that would be required to restore the prior 
level of imports.  Accordingly, an industry with low natural barriers to trade tends 
to “overcompensate” for the shock thereby causing the equilibrium level of the 
import-penetration ratio to fall. 
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Figure 2.2 
 This nonmonotonic relationship can also be conceptualized in terms of the 
extensive and intensive margins of trade.  When a change in natural barriers causes 
a relatively greater change along the extensive margin of trade than it does along the 
intensive margin of trade, then the direct effect of the change in the natural barrier 
determines the direction of the change in the import-penetration ratio.  This is the 
case when the natural barrier is especially high—an exogenous shock that increases 
imports has an especially strong effect on the entrance of new foreign firms into the 
domestic market.  Even though the import-competing industry lobbies and the tariff 
is raised, it does not completely offset the increase in imports.  On the other hand, 
when a change in natural barriers causes a relatively greater change along the 
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intensive margin of trade than it does along the extensive margin of trade, then the 
indirect effect of the change in the natural barrier, through the tariff, determines the 
direction of the change in the import-penetration ratio.  When the natural barrier is 
low, an exogenous shock that increases imports will have its strongest effect on the 
per-firm quantity of imports.  In this case, when the import-competing industry 
lobbies and is granted protection, the new tariff rate more than offsets the increase 
in imports.  The maximum level of the import-penetration ratio occurs at a 
threshold value of F where the extensive-margin effect and the intensive-margin 
effect completely offset. 
 Considering endogenous tariffs and the level of trade together provides insight 
into an active debate within the empirical literature.  A common result is the 
distinction between two sub-groups of industries, one characterized by a positive 
relationship between import-penetration and tariffs and the other characterized by a 
negative relationship between import-penetration and tariffs (e.g., Goldberg and 
Maggi 1999 and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000).  In the original PFS 
framework, these groups are delineated according to political organization.  Yet some 
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authors have criticized this interpretation on the grounds that political organization 
and contributions are also endogenous to the model (e.g., Imai 2008a, 2008b).  In the 
model presented here, both patterns emerge—industries characterized by relatively 
high natural barriers to trade (above the threshold) will generate a positive 
correlation between import penetration and tariff protection, while industries 
characterized by relatively low natural barriers to trade (below the threshold) will 
generate a negative correlation between the level of trade and tariff protection.  This 
configuration is illustrated in figure 2.3.  Note that this pattern emerges in our model 
even though all industries are assumed to be politically active. 
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Figure 2.4 
 Examination of the endogenous political contributions yields additional 
insight.  Generally, as F  falls, political contributions rise, as illustrated in figure 2.4.7  
Recall that contributions come out of the total profits earned by all firms in an 
industry, and they are set by lobbies so as to make the government’s participation 
constraint bind.  In the influential empirical work of Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), the method used for delineating organized and 
unorganized industries was to construct a cutoff level of political contributions above 
                                                           
7 Contributions begin to fall again at very low levels of F .  This is because in this low range, average 
prices are actually increasing with increased imports—the effect of the rise in the foreign export cutoff 
on the average price begins to outweigh the fall in the domestic cutoff because of the large share of 
imported varieties in the domestic consumption basket.  This corresponds to a situation in which 
there is “too much trade,” even from the perspective of utilitarian social welfare, so the lobbies need 
not contribute as much to compensate the government and acquire tariff protection.  
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which industries were coded as ‘organized.’  In both papers, it was precisely these 
‘organized’ industries (relatively larger contributions) that exhibited a negative 
relationship between tariff protection and import-penetration.  Consequently, these 
empirical results were interpreted as offering support for the central hypotheses of 
the PFS model.  Yet when we consider the pattern illustrated by figures 2.3 and 2.4 
together, a new explanation emerges.  In this model, all industries are organized, all 
industries make political contributions and all industries receive tariff protection.  
The crux is that all three of these endogenous outcomes are driven by variation in F.  
Industries on the upper end of the fixed-cost spectrum value tariffs less, contribute 
less and thus permit increases in imports as F falls.  As a result, the tariff rises along 
with the import-penetration ratio, not because the industry is unorganized, but 
because it continues to enjoy a degree of ‘natural’ protection.  Conversely, industries 
on the lower end of the fixed-cost spectrum value tariffs more, contribute more and 
succeed in lowering the level of imports as F falls.  As a result, the tariff rises while 
the import-penetration ratio falls, not because the industry is organized, but because 
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it does not enjoy much ‘natural’ protection and so must actively lobby for political 
protection. 
 This explanation for the endogenous relationship between imports and tariffs 
offers a unifying framework for reconciling the early empirical work of Leamer 
(1988), Trefler (1993) and Lee and Swagel (1996), who find a positive relationship, 
and that of Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), 
who identify a negative relationship.  In our model both occur and are dependent on 
the degree to which an industry enjoys ‘natural’ protection in the form of high fixed 
costs of trade.  
 When considering the effects of trade and protection on industry-level 
productivity, it is natural to examine the changes in the domestic marginal-cost 
cutoff, 
H
c , as illustrated in figure 2.5.  Recall that when this variable increases, more 
domestic firms find it easier to compete in the home market.  Moreover, these 
previously uncompetitive firms have higher marginal costs (lower productivities) 
than the average for the industry.  Conversely, when 
H
c  decreases, fewer home firms 
are able to successfully compete in the home market, and those that exit have higher 
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marginal costs (lower productivities) than the average for the industry.  Hence, a 
familiar prediction in heterogeneous-firm models is that increased trade flows will 
have a pro-competitive effect, lowering 
H
c  and raising the average productivity of 
the industry (e.g., Melitz 2003).  We see this in our model as well; just as the 
relationship between the fixed cost of trade and the import-penetration ratio is 
nonmonotonic, so the relationship between the domestic cost cutoff 
H
c  and the fixed 
cost of trade is also nonmonotonic. 
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A fall in F will reduce the domestic cutoff (raise average productivity) 
because it encourages more foreign competition and forcing the least productive 
domestic firms to exit.  But a fall in F also triggers more lobbying and a higher 
tariff, providing protection for many of these same least productive firms.  The net 
effect on average productivity is nonmonotonic and inversely related to the import-
penetration ratio.  When the natural barrier to trade is high, we would expect to 
observe a positive relationship between tariff protection and average productivity.  
These industries are simultaneously acquiring greater tariff protection and increasing 
their average productivity—precisely because the new tariff is not large enough to 
stymie all of the new imports.  By contrast, for industries with low natural barriers, 
we would expect to observe a negative relationship between tariff protection and 
average productivity.  These industries are acquiring high enough tariffs to reduce 
the level of imports thereby protecting their least-productive firms. 
 In this model, then, the most productive industries are characterized by the 
highest levels of trade, but they are expected to have neither the highest nor the 
lowest tariffs.  Moreover, just as these most productive industries are characterized 
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by intermediate-level tariffs, so too are they characterized by intermediate levels of 
political contributions.  In other words, some industries are less productive because 
of ‘natural’ barriers to trade which substitute for tariff protection and require little 
or no political contributions.  Other industries are less productive because of their 
rent-seeking activities—in the absence of ‘natural’ barriers, these industries actively 
lobby for tariff protection, offer larger political contributions and thereby reduce the 
level of trade.  The most productive sectors occupy that space wherein changes in 
‘natural’ barriers to trade are just offset by changes in political barriers. 
The Large-Country Case 
 A consequence of the small-country assumption is that the home government 
does not act strategically with respect to foreign economic variables.  In this section 
we reformulate the model to capture the international dimension of trade policy.  
The large-country version of the model features a “two-level” endogenous tariff game 
in the spirit of Putnam (1988), Mo (1994) and Grossman and Helpman (1996), 
where the home governments act strategically with respect to domestic lobbies and 
with respect to the foreign government.  The results show that the substitution 
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effect between the fixed cost of trade and the endogenous tariff that formed the 
centerpiece of the previous section is not limited to the small-country case. 
 Consider a two-country model where the home country is the same as above 
and the foreign country has symmetric utility functions, production functions, cost 
distributions and political structures.  We denote home variables with the subscript 
H and foreign variables with the subscript F.  We add foreign versions of the same 
modeling equations, with a few notable exceptions.  First, the expressions for home 
country exports to the foreign country in (2.10) must be rewritten so as to represent 
foreign demand explicitly, thereby adding the price index in the foreign country as 
an additional endogenous variable.  The new expressions take the form 
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Second, the derivation of the cost cutoff for home firms to export in (2.12) must 
reflect the same endogenous price index in the foreign country, and we need to add 
the derivation of the cost cutoff for foreign firms to sell in their domestic market.  
The new expressions take the form  
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Third, the expressions for the total value of domestic sales and imports in (2.13) are 
similarly updated.  The new expressions take the form 
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Finally, we must add a free-entry condition for the foreign country that determines 
the number of foreign firms seeking entry.  This expression is analogous to (2.16) 
and takes the form 
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 The foreign government chooses its tariff to maximize an objective function 
that is symmetric to that of the home government in (2.20) and takes the form 
 { }max SW ( , ) ( )PC ( , ) s.t. 1
j
F
j j j j j j
F F H F F H F
τ
τ τ α τ τ τ+ ≥  (2.26) 
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Note that both tariffs now enter the objective functions of both governments.  In the 
large-country model, each government recognizes that it can affect the price index 
and entry in the other country.  Moreover, each government recognizes that the 
other tariff can affect the price index and entry in its own country.  Consequently, 
we interpret both government’s first-order conditions as reaction functions of the 
form ( )j j
H F
τ τ  and ( )j j
F H
τ τ .  The Nash equilibrium vector of tariffs is then determined 
by solving these reaction functions simultaneously. 
 Once again we turn to numerical methods to solve the model.8  Figure 2.6 
graphs the reaction function of the home government.  It is downward sloping, 
capturing the idea that the home government finds it optimal to lower its own tariff 
when faced with a higher foreign tariff.  That is, the home and foreign tariffs act as 
“strategic substitutes,” as in Brander and Spencer’s (1985) influential work on 
oligopoly and trade policy.  The common element is that the strategic decision-
makers are Cournot players—faced with increased competition and market 
penetration from abroad, the best response for the home player is to accommodate 
                                                           
8 Unless otherwise noted, the graphs in this section are drawn for 
3.0, 3.5, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 10000.
H F e H F
c f F f E Eσ κ α α= = = = = = = = = =  
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the foreign player.9  In our model this property emerges because of the tariff’s effect 
on entry—a higher foreign tariff not only protects its own domestic market, but it 
also promotes foreign exports to the home country by encouraging new foreign start-
ups.  Consequently, a higher foreign tariff raises the welfare cost to the home 
government of raising its own tariff. 
 The three curves are drawn for different values of F, the fixed cost of trade 
facing firms in either country.  Increases in the fixed cost of trade shift the reaction 
function inward, all else equal.  This is consistent with the logic of our previous 
results—the fixed cost of trade is a substitute for tariffs.  A higher fixed cost of trade 
leads the home government to choose a lower tariff for any given foreign tariff 
because industries already shielded by a high fixed cost of trade value tariffs less 
(and so offer less in political contributions) than industries with a low fixed cost of 
trade. 
 
 
                                                           
9 This is in contrast to models with upward-sloping reaction functions characterized by Bertrand 
competition as in Eaton and Grossman (1986). 
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Figure 2.6  
 Figure 2.7 graphs the reaction function of the home government for different 
values of 
H
α , the weight the home government places on political contributions.  
The dashed curves are drawn for positive values of 
H
α , where increases in the value 
of 
H
α
 
shift the reaction function outward, all else equal.  This is consistent with our 
previous results—the more the home government cares about political contributions 
(and therefore industry profits), the higher the tariff it will choose for any given 
foreign tariff. 
 The horizontal line with the smallest dashes in figure 2.7 is drawn for a home 
government that places no weight on political contributions ( 0)
H
α = .  This curve 
illustrates the idea that utilitarian governments, who care only about consumer 
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welfare, can never do better than to adopt free trade regardless of the size of the 
foreign tariff.  This is because consumers only care about average prices in this 
model, and raising the home tariff always increases average prices in the home 
market.  It is interesting to note that this is a slight departure from what we 
observed in the small-country model.  There, even a utilitarian government might 
choose a positive tariff as a second-best response to the distortions created by 
imperfect competition.  In the large-country case, however, this optimal-tariff 
rationale disappears because a rise in the home tariff reduces entry in the foreign 
country.  This has an anti-competitive effect—markups of the surviving firms rise. 
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 A Nash equilibrium is defined as that vector ( , )j j
H F
τ τ  that simultaneously 
solves the system of first order conditions given by 
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The equilibrium vector is that combination of the home and foreign tariff that 
simultaneously satisfy each government’s reaction function.  These endogenous 
tariffs are therefore optimal in the sense that they maximize their respective 
government objective functions (the domestic game) and they represent a best-
response to the other government’s tariff (the international game). 
 It is important to note this equilibrium need not be optimal from a global 
perspective.  Let us define a vector of tariffs to be globally optimal if it maximizes 
the sum of the two countries’ welfare functions.  Figure 2.8 graphs the symmetric 
case where global welfare is measured on the vertical axis and the (identical) tariff is 
measured on the horizontal axis.  From this graph it is easy to see that global 
welfare is maximized (and in the symmetric case each country is better off) when 
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both countries adopt free trade.  This is the classic noncooperative result—in the 
absence of a commitment mechanism, the lack of trust leads each government to a 
tariff equilibrium that is optimal and yet costly from a welfare perspective.  This 
result holds across all values of the parameters, including 
H
α ; even governments that 
value political contributions can be made better off if both countries adopt free 
trade.  This result is consistent with the work of Bagwell and Staiger (1999; 2002) 
who argue that multilateral institutions such as the WTO are designed to help 
countries conclude mutually advantageous trade agreements that are not necessarily 
optimal from the perspective of any single country.  The remainder of this section 
explores the connection between country and industry characteristics and 
equilibrium tariffs. 
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Figure 2.8 
 We first consider identical home and foreign countries where the home 
reaction function is graphed as the narrow curve and the foreign reaction function is 
graphed as the broad curve.  The intersection of the two represents the optimal tariff 
vector. 
 Figure 2.9 illustrates the comparative static effect of σ , the elasticity of 
substitution, on the equilibrium tariffs.  An increase in σ  shifts both reaction 
functions outward, all else equal, resulting in a higher pair of equilibrium tariffs.  
This is because industries for which consumers have a higher elasticity of 
substitution among varieties are less competitive and hence the marginal benefits of 
tariffs are magnified in each country. 
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 Figure 2.10 illustrates the comparative static effect of κ , the shape parameter 
on the Pareto distribution.  An increase in κ  shifts both reaction functions inward, 
all else equal, resulting in a lower pair of equilibrium tariffs.  This is because κ  
captures the skew in the distribution of productivities, with higher values indicating 
a larger proportion of high-cost firms in the industry.  Higher values of κ  have a 
pro-competitive effect thereby lowering the marginal benefit of tariffs in each 
country. 
 As discussed above, lower values of F and higher values of α  cause reaction 
functions to shift outward, and figures 2.11 and 2.12 illustrate this for both 
countries.  Accordingly, industries with a lower fixed cost of trade are characterized 
by higher tariffs, and governments that place a higher value on political 
contributions choose higher tariffs. 
 Figure 2.13 illustrates an asymmetric change—an increase in the size of the 
home country relative to the foreign country.  A relatively larger country has two 
key features—a larger domestic market and a larger resource (capital) pool with 
which to start new firms.  This size advantage triggers a “home-market” effect that 
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raises the marginal benefit of tariffs, all else equal.  As a result, the reaction function 
for the home government shifts outward.  At the same time, the relatively smaller 
country experiences a fall in the marginal benefits of tariffs, all else equal.  This 
causes the reaction function for the foreign government to shift inward.  The new 
equilibrium tariff vector reflects this new asymmetry—the home country chooses a 
higher tariff while the foreign country chooses a lower tariff. 
 Finally, figure 2.14 illustrates another asymmetric change—an increase in the 
weight placed on political contributions by the home country.  As discussed above, 
an increase in 
H
α  shifts the reaction function for the home country outward.  It has 
no effect on the reaction function of the foreign country.  In the new equilibrium, the 
home country both values higher tariffs and is able to force the foreign government 
to move along its own curve to a lower foreign tariff. 
 In summary, our exploration of the theoretical model with a large-country 
assumption confirms the central insights provided by the small-country version.  In 
particular, when the fixed cost of trade falls, industries seek higher tariffs from the 
government and are willing to offer greater political contributions, as before.  The 
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government takes the deal, even though it knows that its own tariff policy will have 
spill-over effects onto the foreign government.  In equilibrium, lower natural barriers 
in both countries lead the governments to enact higher tariffs that balance the 
domestic interests and are also best responses to each other.  More generally, the 
comparative static effects of changes in the elasticity of substitution σ, the shape 
parameter on the Pareto distribution κ, the relative weight the government places on 
political contributions from producer interests α, and the fixed cost of trade F are 
similar in both the large- and small-country cases.  This is true even though the 
large-country version involves an additional layer of strategic interaction.    
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Figure 2.9 
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Figure 2.11 
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Figure 2.13 
 
Figure 2.14 
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 The central premise that motivates most of the political economy and public 
choice literature is that the government does not automatically act in the best 
interests of all its citizens—that it does not necessarily use its policy-making 
authority to maximize collective welfare.  Rather, this literature postulates that 
government decisions about the economy respond to political pressures and 
contributions.  This approach may seem disconcerting to most non-cynical citizens 
and many traditional economists.  Yet it is an important vehicle for explaining why 
so many economic and commercial policies remain suboptimal from a welfare 
perspective. 
 The original “Protection for Sale” [PFS] model presented by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) [GH] demonstrates the internal logic by which trade policy is 
influenced by industrial lobbies.  Two features of their model are especially 
prominent in the associated empirical literature: the relative weight the government 
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places on political contributions from import-competing industries, α , and the 
distinction between politically organized and unorganized industries.  Empirical 
investigations by Goldberg and Maggi, 1999 [GM] and Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay, 2000 [GB] yielded promising results consistent with GH’s 
predictions.  The estimated relationship between imports and protection was 
negative among politically organized industries, while for politically unorganized 
industries the estimated relationship was positive or altogether absent. 
 The subsequent evidence is more mixed, however, with much criticism 
directed at the operationalization of political organization. 1  Many papers have 
addressed the simplicity of the political structure of the original PFS model (e.g., 
Mitra et al., 2006; Imai et al., 2008), but there is relatively little focus in the 
literature on the simplicity of the underlying economy.  That is, the existing research 
has sought to improve upon the PFS framework by further developing and refining 
the political and lobbying apparatus.  By contrast, this dissertation seeks to improve 
upon the PFS framework by making the underlying economy more realistic.  In 
                                                           
1 See chapter 1 for details. 
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chapter 2 we formulated a theoretical model that embedded the PFS framework in 
an economy characterized by fixed costs, free entry and heterogeneous firms.  That 
model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of imports and the 
level of trade protection that is driven by variation in ‘natural’ barriers to trade, 
rather than by differences in political organization.  Indeed, political contributions, 
the basis for most attempts at distinguishing organized from unorganized industries, 
is shown also to be an endogenous outcome of the model.  
 In this chapter we lay out an empirical strategy for estimating the structural 
parameters of the theoretical model using GB’s original data, modified and 
augmented as explained below.  The results reinforce the logic of the PFS approach 
and refine our understanding of its empirical content.  In particular, when 
incorporating a more sophisticated model of economic activity, and when adopting 
an empirical methodology that captures the structural connections, we find that the 
size and significance of α  is even greater than previously estimated.  In addition, we 
demonstrate that the organized-unorganized distinction among industries is 
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unnecessary for estimation purposes, and that its inclusion tarnishes earlier estimates 
with selection bias. 
Preliminaries 
 The estimation and hypothesis tests in this chapter are all conducted using 
the original data of GB.  We employ these data because they permit comparisons 
with the results offered by GB, GM and many others who have estimated the PFS 
tariff equation.  These published results have proven very influential in the 
literature, and an alternative explanation should confront them on their own terms.  
The data cover a single cross-section of U.S. industries.  As a result, we must adopt 
a set of simplifying assumptions designed to render the model empirically tractable.  
Normally, we might expect many of the model’s parameters to be industry-specific, 
but there are not enough degrees of freedom to estimate such a specification.  
Instead, we assume that all model parameters are common across industries, foreign 
and domestic.  Hence the parameter estimates we generate represent averages.2 
                                                           
2 Ideally a panel approach could be used to separately identify industry-specific parameters.  This 
would require that the key variables be available in longitudinal form.  While tariff levels are surely 
available in this form, the author is not aware of any NTB coverage ratios that have been computed 
and collected over time.  This is a fruitful avenue for future research.   
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 A second difficulty concerns the absence of available measures of the number 
of importing firms for a given industry.  This measure is important in accounting for 
the extensive margin of trade, or the relative number of foreign to domestic varieties.  
However, if we assume that each foreign country produces a single, differentiated 
variety of a good, akin to the Armington assumption, then we can augment GB’s 
data with a simple count of the number of distinct source countries of imports for 
each industry.  This is admittedly a crude measure as consumers are likely to 
differentiate between goods from a single country.  Nevertheless, for two industries 
with otherwise similar levels of imports and similar levels of protection, the logic of 
the Melitz (2003) model would lead us to expect that the industry with fewer 
distinct source countries is characterized by higher “natural barriers” to exporting to 
the U.S. market. 
 The theoretical model, as presented in chapter 2, is nonlinear and 
unfortunately cannot be written as a set of reduced-form equations.  Rather, we 
capture the core of the model in a set of 4 structural equations that determine the 
level of trade protection, the import elasticity, the import-penetration ratio and the 
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ratio of foreign to domestic varieties.  The notation and variables used here are as 
defined in chapter 2.  There are three parameters of interest. 0α≥  is the relative 
weight the government places on political contributions in its objective function, 
with 1α =  signifying an equal weighting on consumer utility and political 
contributions while 0α =  represents a government uninterested in political 
contributions. 1σ >  is the preference parameter capturing the elasticity of 
substitution. 0κ>  is the shape parameter on the Pareto distribution of 
productivities. 
The first equation to be considered is the government’s first-order condition 
for choosing the optimal level of trade protection.  Let G( )i  represent the 
government’s objective function that balances aggregate consumer utility against 
political contributions offered by industry lobbies.  The government’s choice variable 
is the level of trade protection, represented by τ .  Let g( )i  represent the first 
derivative of the objective function with respect to the choice variable.  Then the 
government’s FOC is g( ) 0=i .  This FOC is nonlinear in the parameters and cannot 
be solved explicitly for the choice variable τ .  Consequently, we treat the function 
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g( )i  as an elementary zero function (see Davidson and MacKinnon 2004).  The key 
point is that the expectation of an elementary zero function must go to zero when 
evaluated at the true value of the parameters, but not otherwise.  Thus, for any 
particular observation, the estimating equation takes the form 
1
g( ) 0ε+ =i , or  
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where 
,1
~ (0,1)
j
Nε  represents industry-specific error.3 
The second equation is the derivation of the import elasticity.  Most 
researchers in this literature acknowledge that, technically, this elasticity should be 
treated as endogenous to the model; then they go on to use it as an exogenous 
regressor.  Here we can write the import elasticity as a function of the import-
penetration ratio and the model parameters. Let e represent the import elasticity for 
                                                           
3 In all of the estimating equations variables carrying a j subscript represent vectors of size 1 x j 
where j indexes industries 1,…,J = 241.  Unsubscripted parameters are assumed to be equal across 
industries.    
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a given industry, 
f
Q  the quantity of imports aggregated across all foreign varieties, 
and f
h
p
p
 the relative price of imports.  Then following Dixit and Norman (1980) e is 
defined as 
 
( )
f
h
f
h
p
pf
p
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dQ
e
Qd
= , 
and takes the form 
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.  (3.2) 
In GB’s original paper, they use ‘corrected’ values of the import elasticity originally 
estimated by Sheills et al. (1986).  Their corrections are based on an error-in-
variables approach described in the appendix of their paper.  We are using these 
same corrected estimates.  The error term 2
,2 2
~ (0, )
j
Nε σ  captures typical 
measurement and industry-specific error. 
 The third and fourth equations are the derivations of the import-penetration 
ratio and the ratio of foreign to domestic varieties from the structural model: 
 
,3
1
( )( )( )(exp[ ])
1
j j j
j j j
j j j
Z V F
Z V f
ψ τ ε
−
=
−
 (3.3) 
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The error terms 2
,3 3
~ (0, )
j
Nε σ  and 
2
,4 4
~ (0, )
j
Nε σ  represent industry-specific errors in 
each case. 
 Unfortunately, the fixed-cost ratio is unobserved, so we must combine 
equations (3.3) and (3.4) into a single composite equation, substituting away the 
fixed-cost ratio.  The resulting equation is written in logarithmic form and includes 
both error terms 
,3j
ε  and 
,4j
ε . 
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This composite equation introduces potential problems for estimation of the 
structural parameters.  Specifically, although V is endogenous in the model, it 
appears on the right-hand side of (3.5) as a regressor.  Thus we can no longer 
maintain the assumption that the regressors are independent of the composite error 
term.  Below, we outline and implement an indirect inference methodology to work 
around this problem and avoid the potential estimation bias.  Results from an 
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application of GMM to the same set of empirical equations are presented in 
appendix D.  
Implementing Indirect Inference 
 Despite the simplifications and functional form assumptions, there is no easy 
way to estimate directly the structural parameters in this model.  This is due in 
large part to the (1) nonlinear structural relationships and (2) simultaneity among 
the endogenous variables.  Many of the familiar microeconometric frameworks are 
designed to address one or the other of these difficulties, but not both.  For example, 
two-stage least squares and quantile regressions are viable options for dealing with 
simultaneity, but they are not designed to estimate equations that are nonlinear in 
the parameters.  By contrast, nonlinear least squares can handle the nonlinearity, 
but is not suited for handling simultaneity and instrumentation.  As an alternative 
strategy, we turn to the method of indirect inference as presented in Smith (1993), 
Gouriéroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) and Li (2010).  This method proceeds in 
three steps.  First, we chose an auxiliary model that is related to the model of 
interest, but has the virtue of being easier to estimate.  The coefficients of this 
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auxiliary model (sometimes called pseudo-true parameters) are estimated using 
standard techniques.  The second step is to link the pseudo-true parameters from the 
auxiliary model to the structural parameters of the model of interest through the use 
of binding functions.  In this application, we shall generate and estimate the binding 
functions by simulating the model of interest.  Finally, the indirect estimates of the 
structural parameters are obtained by minimizing an appropriate criterion function.  
Each of these steps is described in detail below. 
 The great advantage of the method of indirect inference is the ability to 
identify structural parameters even in the midst of simultaneous endogenous 
relationships.  For models that suffer from underidentification, because of 
nonlinearities in the parameters or weak instruments, the method of indirect 
inference is a viable alternative, provided the model can be simulated and connected 
to an appropriately chosen auxiliary model. 
Step 1: The Auxiliary Model 
 We choose for our auxiliary model a simple linear equation in which the level 
of trade protection (measured separately by NTB coverage ratios and by average 
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tariff rates) is regressed on a vector of explanatory variables that are commonly 
employed as determinants of trade policy: import-penetration ratio, import elasticity, 
transportation costs, total value of domestic output, total number of production 
workers on payroll, relative capital-to-labor ratio and industry-level political 
contributions (Trefler, 1993; GM, 1999; GB, 2000).  This includes several variables 
on the right-hand side that are widely acknowledged as endogenous to the process 
(import-penetration, import elasticity, contributions) and hence would normally be 
the cause of much concern over simultaneity bias.  But we do not intend to interpret 
these coefficients—they will not be used for testing hypotheses, uncovering structural 
parameters or capturing marginal effects.  These beta coefficients are simply targets 
for our optimization routine.  They provide a window on the data, capturing and 
describing particular aspects of the sample.  Our goal will be to replicate the OLS 
coefficients, bias and all, as closely as possible by simulating the model for different 
values of the structural parameters.  In this sense the beta coefficients are sufficient 
statistics for the sample, summarizing all of the relevant information contained 
within the data.  If two data sets generated the same values for the beta coefficients, 
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then our procedure will always yield the same inferences about the structural 
parameters.    Let βˆ  represent the vector of beta coefficients generated by OLS 
estimation of the auxiliary model.   
Step 2: The Binding Functions 
 The vector of structural parameters θ  we are seeking to estimate consists of 
the elasticity of substitution σ , the shape parameter on the distribution of 
productivities κ , the relative weight the government places on contributions α , the 
constant term in the trade equation 
0
b , and the three free error variances 
2 3 4
, ,λ λ λ .  
Let ( )b θ  represent the binding functions, linking the vector of structural parameters 
θ  to the vector of regression coefficients βˆ  described above.  These binding 
functions translate a given vector of structural parameter values θ  into a vector of 
coefficient estimates *( )
s
β θ  corresponding to the auxiliary model.  They take the form  
 *
1
1
( ) ( )
S
s
sS =
= ∑b θ β θ  (3.6) 
where S is the number of simulations and *( )
s
β θ  is the vector of coefficients 
generated by estimating the same auxiliary model in step 1, but using the simulated 
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data implied by a given vector θ .  This is accomplished by simulating the key 
structural variables S times, estimating the auxiliary model on the simulated data 
each time and averaging over the resulting coefficients. 
 Our simulation process involves four steps.  First, for a given θ  and for draws 
from standard normal error distributions, we solve the nonlinear system given by 
equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.5).  This is done once for each observation (N = 241), 
resulting in simulated values for τ  (the level of protection), e (the import elasticity) 
and Z (the import-penetration ratio).  Second, we estimate the auxiliary model as in 
step 1 but using the simulated values for τ , e and Z and capture the resulting 
coefficient estimates.  Third, we repeat the procedure S times for the same 
parameter vector θ , but drawing new errors each time.  Finally, we average the 
simulated coefficient estimates to form ( )b θ . 
Step 3: Minimizing the Criterion Function 
 Let Q( )θ  represent the criterion function used for choosing estimates for θ .  
Then we can write 
 1ˆ ˆˆQ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))Σ−′= − −b bθ β θ β θ  (3.7) 
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where Σˆ  is a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of βˆ .  The parameter 
estimates θˆ  are then obtained by minimizing Q( )θ  with respect to θ .  This can be 
thought of as minimizing the sum of squared residuals, where the residuals in 
question are the differences between the coefficient vector estimated in step 1 and 
the implied coefficient vector for any given vector of structural parameters, i.e., 
ˆ ( )− bβ θ .   As discussed in Davidson and MacKinnon (2004), this criterion function 
is distributed 2χ , so hypothesis tests on θˆ  can be conducted by comparing restricted 
and unrestricted values of Q( )θ . 
 The minimization of this criterion function can be computationally expensive.  
All search algorithms that employ derivatives of the criterion function must compute 
these derivatives numerically, and doing so involves completing the simulation 
process for each computed derivative.  As an alternative, we choose to implement 
the Nelder-Mead algorithm (Nelder and Mead 1965; see also Lagarias, et al. 1998), a 
direct search method that does not require the computation of derivatives.  The 
researcher chooses starting values for the parameters and values for delta, the size of 
the initial parameter step.  These values are then used to build a multidimensional 
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simplex, and the objective function (the criterion function) is evaluated at the 
vertices of the simplex.  The algorithm is designed to move away from the poorest 
(largest) value of the criterion, adapting and continually revising the simplexes in 
response to these values.  A minimum is reached when the working simplex is 
sufficiently small, that is, when the criterion values are close enough to satisfy a 
tolerance limit. 
 The method of indirect inference is more common within time-series 
econometrics but is growing in popularity among microeconomists.  Its application to 
political-economy models and trade data is still novel.  In an attempt to bridge this 
gap, and to convince the reader of the applicability of this method to our problem, 
we have conducted a Monte Carlo-style experiment in appendix E in which a 
nonlinear system of equations is simulated for a similar sample size and selected 
parameters are estimated using the method of indirect inference.  
Inference 
  As recently noted by Li (2010), indirect inference offers an important 
advantage over likelihood-based methods for testing hypotheses in structural 
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models—the indirect inference estimator is n  asymptotically normal, allowing for 
standard tests of significance.  Moreover, according to Gourieroux et al. (1993), the 
familiar Wald test, score test and a test based on the comparison of the constrained 
and unconstrained values of the criterion function are asymptotically equivalent.  
Here, we test individual elements of the vector θ  by comparing the restricted and 
unrestricted values of Q( )θ .  The minimized value of the criterion function follows a 
2( )l kχ −  distribution, where l is the number of parameters estimated in the 
unrestricted model and k is the number of parameters estimated in the restricted 
model.  Thus, testing one parameter restriction involves estimating the model with 
the parameter free (unrestricted), estimating the model again under the restriction 
implied by the null hypothesis (restricted), calculating the difference between the 
two minimized criterion functions (test statistic) and comparing it to an appropriate 
critical value taken from the 2(1)χ  distribution.  For a 95% confidence level, the 
critical value is 3.841.  All hypothesis tests discussed below follow this procedure. 
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Operationalization of Variables 
 We adopt the original variables and data of GB consisting of a single cross-
section of U.S. manufacturing industries classified according to the 4-digit SIC 
system (1972 revision).  The variables used are the coverage ratio of non-tariff 
barriers, the total value of imports, the total value of exports, the import elasticity, 
the capital-labor ratio, the proportion of the industry labor force classified as 
unskilled, the proportion of the industry labor force classified as a scientist or 
researcher, and the political contributions of political-action committees aggregated 
to the industry level.  These data are then augmented by variables capturing 
industry characteristics, including average tariff rates, transportation costs, industry 
aggregate five-factor productivity, proportion of industry capital stock devoted to 
plants and structures and the number of production workers on payroll.  In addition, 
we add a measure of the extensive margin of trade constructed as the ratio of the 
number of distinct source countries for imports to the number of domestic firms in 
operation at the industry level.  All data are for 1983 unless otherwise stated.  All 
variables, labels, definitions and sources are available in table 3.1.    
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Results 
The coefficient estimates generated by OLS estimation of the auxiliary model 
are presented in table 3.2.  Note that we use seven regressors, so that the dimension 
of β  is exactly equal to the dimension of θ , resulting in a just-identified model.  
Although we do not interpret or draw inferences about these coefficients, it is 
interesting that some of the coefficients have the expected signs (transportation cost, 
total domestic production, total number of production workers) while other have 
counterintuitive signs (import elasticity, relative capital-to-labor ratio, and political 
contributions).  Notably, the import-penetration ratio carries a positive coefficient.  
In addition, it is important to note that standard errors are quite low.  This lends 
confidence to our indirect inference procedure and ensures that the matching 
algorithm is not targeting imprecise measures of the sample data characteristics.       
 The first column of table 3.3 reports baseline estimates for the structural 
parameters generated according to the indirect inference procedure outlined above.  
The point estimates fall into ranges consistent with theoretical expectations.  
Specifically, they satisfy the assumptions 0, 1, 0κ σ α> > ≥
 
and the regularity 
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condition 1 0κ σ− + > .  The estimates are also not altogether different than those 
produced using the GMM procedure in appendix D.  Moreover, although the 
products of very different approaches and methods, our estimate σ  is remarkably 
close to that estimated by Bernard et al. (2003) ( 3.8σ = ) using U.S. firm-level data, 
while our estimate for κ  is somewhat smaller than the average of the estimates 
obtained by Balistreri et al. (2009) ( 4.5κ = ).  The estimate for the constant in 
equation 3 is represented by b0, and the lambdas are the estimates of the ratios of 
the standard deviations of the errors, such that 
2 2 1 3 3 1 4 4 1
/ , / , /λ σ σ λ σ σ λ σ σ= = = , 
where 
1
σ  has been normalized to 1. 
 The value of α  is of most interest to the political-economy literature.  Recall 
that this parameter is interpreted as the weight the government places on political 
contributions relative to consumer interests.  Our estimate, ˆ 2.986α = , suggests that 
the government favors contributions over consumers at almost a 3-to-1 rate.  That is 
to say, the pattern of trade and protection observed in the data is consistent with a 
government that is willing to trade approximately $3 of consumer welfare for $1 of 
political contributions.  This parameter estimate is considerably higher than those 
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produced by the two most prominent studies, 0.021 by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) 
and 0.905 by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).  It is also larger than the 
estimates produced using GMM in appendix D, which range from approximately 2 to 
2.5. 
 As a first check on the robustness of these estimates, we estimate the same 
model using the same indirect approach for a measure of average industry tariffs in 
the second column of table 3.3.  The estimates are remarkably similar, even though 
the two measures of trade policy are only weakly correlated (Pearson’s coefficient 
0.21).  We interpret these results as evidence that, although there are important 
differences in these two measures of protection, they are not so different as to require 
different structural explanations.  Consequently, all remaining results considered 
here are estimated using GB’s measure of non-tariff barriers. 
 As a further check on the robustness of the estimation results and the indirect 
inference algorithm we altered several of the key elements of the procedure.  These 
results are presented in table 3.4.  Overall, the estimates are fairly insensitive to 
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changes in the convergence tolerance limit, the size of the initial simplex delta, the 
number of simulations and the starting values. 
 One limitation of our approach is the estimation of single values for the 
parameters for all industries.  We might expect that consumers’ elasticity of 
substitution among varieties varies across types of good; similarly, we might expect 
that the productivity distribution should take on different shapes for different 
industries.  There are insufficient degrees of freedom to estimate separate parameters 
for each industry, yet we can split the sample and construct groups of industries that 
share important features, and then obtain separate parameter estimates for each 
group. 
 Table 3.5 presents results of the first sample split following the industry 
categorization found in GB.  All industries labeled “food” or “natural resources” are 
combined to form group 1, while all industries that are labeled either 
“manufacturers” or “capital goods” are combined to form group 2.  The parameter 
estimates for the two groups of industries are quite close, and we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the parameters are identical; the one exception is σ.  These 
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point estimates suggest that the elasticity of substitution is greater for industries in 
group 2.  This is an intuitive result insofar as manufactured and capital goods are 
characterized by greater variety than are foodstuffs and natural resources.  The null 
hypothesis that these two groups have the same elasticity of substitution is rejected 
at the 10% level of confidence but cannot be rejected at the 5% level of confidence. 
 Table 3.6 presents results for a sample split following an industry 
categorization offered by Rauch (1999).  He divides traded goods into three groups: 
differentiated products, reference-priced (an intermediate category) and 
homogeneous goods.  Presumably, we would expect the group of differentiated goods 
to be characterized by a larger elasticity of substitution than the other two 
categories.  To maintain workable sample sizes, we combine the differentiated and 
reference-priced goods into a single group.  The estimation results are again very 
similar for the two groups, and we cannot reject the null hypotheses that α and κ are 
the same for the two groups.  As we might expect, the estimate of the elasticity of 
substitution for the group of differentiated goods industries is larger than the 
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estimate for the group of homogenous goods industries.  This result is statistically 
significant at the 10% level of confidence. 
 Finally, we use the same sample-splitting strategy to investigate GB’s 
categorization of the sample into those industries that are politically organized and 
those that are not.  According to GH’s original model, politically organized 
industries offer political contributions in exchange for policy protection.  By 
contrast, politically unorganized industries are characterized by trade policies that 
are set according to consumer interests alone.  Typically, this distinction is modeled 
as separate slope coefficients in the tariff equation for each subgroup.  Here, we split 
the sample according to GB’s dummy variable and then estimate the structural 
model on the two subgroups.  The results appear in table 3.7.  They suggest that 
there is no appreciable difference between the two subgroups. 
 It is instructive to compare the results of these sample splits using indirect 
inference to the results obtained using nonlinear GMM (see appendix D).  Regarding 
the first and second sample splits, the two methods are in broad agreement that 
there appears to be some differences in the elasticity of substitution among the 
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subsamples.  However, when splitting the sample according to the organizational 
dummy, the results of the two methods diverge.  As noted above, the indirect 
inference approach failed to distinguish the two groups according to any of the key 
structural parameters.  By contrast, the nonlinear GMM approach provides evidence 
that both σ and κ are statistically different for the two groups.  That is, the GMM 
results suggest that organized industries are characterized by a higher elasticity of 
substitution and a more highly skewed productivity distribution of firms.  What the 
previous literature has identified as differences in political organization is here shown 
to reflect differences in fundamental demand and technological parameters. 
 There are two possible explanations for the difference in the indirect inference 
and GMM results; they nicely illustrate the tradeoffs involved with the two 
methodologies.  On the one hand, as mentioned previously, the GMM estimates are 
potentially plagued by simultaneity bias, and the magnitude of this bias may 
fluctuate across different subsamples.  On the other hand, in the absence of standard 
errors, it is difficult to assess the precision of the indirect inference estimates.  It is 
possible that a simulation-based approach is unable to provide precise estimates for 
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this size sample.  In this case, the two subsamples may indeed differ along the 
structural parameters, but the indirect inference approach is unable to detect this 
difference—especially when, as is the case with the GMM estimates, these differences 
are quite small.  In either case, our results suggest that GB’s separate slope 
coefficients are a statistical artifact.  These two groups of industries may differ 
according to “deeper” structural parameters (κ and σ), or they may differ according 
to other unobserved characteristics, but we show no evidence that so-called 
politically organized industries exercise any more (or less) influence over trade policy 
than unorganized industries—the values for α  when estimated separately for the two 
groups are statistically indistinguishable. 
 This is the first important result of this chapter.  Much of the current 
literature on the political economy of trade policy continues to refer to political 
organization as an important explanatory variable in the PFS framework (e.g., GM 
1999; GB 2000; Eicher and Osang 2002; Mitra and Ulubasoglu 2006; Ederington and 
Minier 2008).  And surely the process of lobby formation and political contributions 
is an important part of the story.  But it is a simultaneous outcome, both 
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influencing and influenced by the level of trade and the level of protection.  
Moreover, all three of these endogenous outcomes are functions of more fundamental 
demand and industry characteristics.  Accordingly, inferences based on the typical 
specification are plagued by bias.  In chapter 2 we advanced the hypothesis that 
differences in natural barriers to trade are an important source of exogenous 
variation across industries.  While the estimates for the structural parameters 
presented in tables 3.3 - 3.7 are consistent with that hypothesis, the absence of 
observable measures of the fixed costs of trade leaves us unable to reject plausible 
alternatives.  In this chapter we offer more direct evidence that differences in the 
elasticity of substitution and in the shape of the industry-level productivity 
distribution are driving the observed difference in political organization. 
 Table 3.8 presents the results from a series of hypothesis tests using the 
baseline model.  The first set of tests address core theoretical assumptions of the 
model.  Specifically, hypothesis (i) tests the null hypothesis that the government 
places no weight on producer interests.  This is soundly rejected at the 1% level of 
confidence.  Our interpretation of this result is that a political-economy model of 
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policymaking with competing economic interests is a better fit to the data than a 
more traditional trade model where policy is decided along strict utilitarian grounds.  
Hypothesis (ii) tests the null hypothesis that the constant term in equation 3 is zero.  
It is rejected at the 5% level of confidence.  Hypothesis (iii) tests the null hypothesis 
that the productivities are distributed uniformly; it is rejected at the 1% level of 
confidence.  We interpret this result as supporting our modeling assumption 
concerning heterogeneous firms.  Hypothesis (iv) tests the regularity condition that 
1κ σ> − .  This is a technical condition required for the convergence of the integrals 
in the theoretical model.  Unfortunately, although the point estimates respect this 
condition, we are unable to reject the statistical possibility that this condition is 
violated in practice. 
 The second set of hypotheses tested in table 3.8 refers to competing estimates 
of α.  Recall from table 3.3 that our estimate for α is 2.986, implying that the 
government favors political contributions from producer interests at approximately a 
3-to-1 rate.  Hypothesis (v) tests the fit of the estimate presented by Goldberg and 
Maggi (1999) (GM).  Their results suggest that the government places a very small 
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relative weight on contributions (α = 0.021) when compared to consumer interests.  
Indeed, their estimate implies that the government would only be willing to trade 
approximately $0.02 of consumer welfare for every extra dollar in contributions from 
import-competing producers.  Our results reject this value for α at the 1% confidence 
level.  Hypothesis (vi) tests the fit of the estimate presented by Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000) (GB).  Their results suggest a fairly even weighting between 
consumer interests and contributions (α = 0.905), implying that the government 
would only be willing to trade approximately $0.90 of consumer welfare for ever 
extra dollar in contributions.  Our results also reject this estimate at the 1% level of 
confidence. 
 Although estimated on essentially the same sample data, the econometric 
specifications in GM and GB differ considerably from that presented here.  GM and 
GB use the standard PFS protection equation, including the political organization 
indicator variable, the import-penetration ratio and the import elasticity.  GM move 
the elasticity to the left-hand side, thereby rescaling the measure of non-tariff 
barriers, while GB treat the import elasticity as an exogenous regressor.  Both GM 
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and GB specify separate reduced-form equations for the import-penetration ratio and 
political organization/contributions.  In neither case are these equations informed by 
theory, nor are they structurally connected to the protection equation.  By contrast, 
we estimate a protection equation that resembles the original PFS formulation but is 
derived from a more complicated and realistic model of the economy.  We make no 
distinction between politically organized and unorganized industries; rather, we test 
whether such distinctions are supported by the data.  Like GM and GB, we employ 
separate estimating equations for the import elasticity and the import-penetration 
ratio, but in our case they are derived from the model of the economy and so share a 
deep structural connection with the protection equation.  As a result, our estimate 
for α is both substantively and statistically different from previous results in the 
literature.  Substantively, our estimate suggests trade policy that is significantly 
skewed in the interests of industry and at the expense of consumers.  Statistically, in 
the context of the structural model, our estimate fits the data better than either of 
the previously published results, is generated using a more comprehensive model of 
trade and trade policy, and is not adulterated by the simultaneity bias that results 
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from the common practice of including the political organization variable in the 
protection equation. 
 The final two hypotheses that appear in table 3.8 test the estimates generated 
by the GMM procedure in appendix D.  These estimates range between 2 and 2.5, so 
hypothesis (vii) tests the value α = 2 and hypothesis (viii) tests the value α = 2.5.  
Both of these results are much closer to the indirect inference results appearing in 
table 3.3 than to any of the previously published results.  Nevertheless, as explained 
in appendix D, the GMM estimating approach differs from indirect inference in 
important ways—most notably, the GMM estimation relies on an assumption of the 
exogeneity of the ratio of foreign to domestic varieties which is not consistent with 
theoretical expectations.  The results of the hypothesis tests indicate that while α = 
2 is rejected at the 1% level, the p-value for α = 2.5 just misses the 5% level of 
confidence.  This suggests that there is some overlap between the range of GMM 
estimates presented in appendix D and the indirect inference estimate considered 
here.     
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Table 3.1: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
ntb 
Non-tariff barriers aggregated to industry level and written 
as ad-valorem rate. 
GB (2000) 
tar 
Tariff barrier calculated as ratio of total duties collected to 
total customs value of imports, written as ad-valorem rate. 
Magee (2001): Census of 
Manufacturers and NBER 
fh
R  Total value of imports in millions of dollars. Feenstra (1998): NBER 
X Total value of exports in millions of dollars. Feenstra (1998): NBER 
Y Total value of domestic shipments in millions of dollars Feenstra (1998): NBER 
hh
R  Total domestic production consumed at home. Calculation: 
hh
R Prod X= −  
E Total domestic consumption. Calculation: hh fhE R R= +  
Z Import-penetration ratio. Calculation: fh
R
Z
E
=  
s 
Transport cost; constructed as the ratio of the total c.i.f. 
value of imports to the total customs value of imports. 
Magee (2001): Census of 
Manufacturers and NBER 
hh
N  Number of domestic firms (varieties). 
U.S. Census Bureau: 
Economic Census (1992) 
fh
N  
Number of foreign firms (varieties).  A count of the number 
of distinct source countries for imports. 
Feenstra (1998): NBER 
V Ratio of domestic to total firms (varieties). Calculation: 
hh
hh fh
N
V
N N
=
+
 
e Import elasticity 
Sheills, et al. (1986);  
GB (2000) 
relkl 
Relative capital-labor ratio; constructed as the ratio of the 
industry capital-labor ratio to the maximum capital-labor 
ratio available in the sample. 
GB (2000) 
reltfp 
Relative total factor productivity; constructed as the ratio of 
the industry aggregate five-factor productivity to the 
maximum aggregate five-factor productivity available in the 
sample. 
NBER Productivity (1996) 
punsk Proportion of industry labor force classified as unskilled. GB (2000) 
psci 
Proportion of industry labor force classified as scientist or 
researcher. 
GB (2000) 
pplant 
Proportion of industry capital stock devoted to plants and 
structures. 
NBER Productivity (1996) 
pac 
Political contributions of political-action committees.  
Originally firm-level, aggregated up to industry level. 
GB (2000) 
workers Number of production workers on payroll. NBER Productivity (1996) 
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Table 3.2: Auxiliary Model             
OLS Regression: Dependent Variable: ntb  (N = 241) 
Regressor β  Std. Error 
Z 0.1846 0.0574 
e 0.0379 0.0224 
s -0.2414 0.0758 
log(Y) 0.0265 0.0068 
workers 0.4022 0.0712 
relkl 0.1248 0.0670 
log(pac) -0.0428 0.0158 
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Table 3.3: Comparing Estimates using Tariffs and Non-tariff Barriers. 
Simulated Variables: , ,e Zτ  
Policy Measure Non-tariff barriers (ntb) Average tariffs (tar) 
N 241 241 
   
Estimates   
α 2.986 3.001 
κ 3.009 2.998 
σ 3.935 3.995 
b0 5.001 5.062 
λ2 0.021 0.010 
λ3 0.005 0.011 
λ4 0.003 0.010 
Q(θ) 84.084 103.583 
Hypothesis Tests 
  
Restriction Test Statistic p-value 
H0: αntb = αtar 1.775 0.183 
H0: κntb = κtar 1.124 0.289 
H0: σntb = σtar 0.125 0.725 
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Table 3.4: Tests for Robustness 
Simulated Variables: , ,e Zτ  
Setting α κ σ b0 λ2 λ3 λ4 Q(θ) 
Convergence 
Tolerance         
10e-6 2.971 3.022 3.995 5.058 0.021 0.022 0.011 84.349 
10e-9 2.972 3.024 3.994 5.063 0.008 0.021 0.021 84.247 
10e-12 2.999 3.001 4.001 5.001 0.009 0.010 0.009 84.742 
Initial Simplex 
Delta 
        
0.1 2.986 3.009 3.935 5.001 0.021 0.005 0.003 84.084 
0.01 2.972 3.024 3.994 5.063 0.008 0.021 0.021 84.247 
0.001 2.953 3.014 3.972 5.015 0.023 0.024 0.022 84.132 
Simulations         
25 2.972 3.024 3.994 5.063 0.008 0.021 0.021 84.247 
50 2.952 3.014 3.969 5.014 0.024 0.022 0.024 84.176 
75 2.952 3.009 3.962 5.018 0.025 0.024 0.021 84.182 
Starting  
Values 
        
α = 1  
κ = 2  
σ = 2   
2.598 2.995 3.974 5.001 0.004 0.014 0.016 87.449 
α = 2.5 
 κ = 3.5  
σ = 3.5  
2.972 3.024 3.994 5.063 0.008 0.021 0.021 84.247 
α = 4.5  
κ = 5.5  
σ = 5.5   
3.075 3.298 3.479 4.971 0.086 0.014 0.027 91.731 
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Table 3.5: Specification Tests (1) 
Simulated Variables: , ,e Zτ  
Sample Split: 
Gawande Types 
Food and Natural Resources  
N = 121 
Manufactured and Capital Goods 
N = 120  
Estimates   
α 3.099 2.949 
κ 2.964 3.006 
σ 3.504 3.898 
b0 4.967 4.969 
λ2 0.021 0.052 
λ3 0.026 0.018 
λ4 0.007 0.017 
Q(θ) 60.782 58.374 
Hypothesis Tests   
Restriction Test Statistic p-value 
H0: α1 = α2 0.163 0.686 
H0: κ1 = κ2 0.252 0.616 
H0: σ1 = σ2 3.401 0.065 
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Table 3.6: Specification Tests (2) 
Simulated Variables: , ,e Zτ  
Sample Split: 
Rauch Types 
Differentiated Goods 
N = 49 
Homogeneous Goods 
N = 181 
Estimates   
α 3.002 2.931 
κ 3.012 2.976 
σ 4.004 3.735 
b0 5.006 5.101 
λ2 0.016 0.023 
λ3 0.015 0.042 
λ4 0.009 0.024 
Q(θ) 60.548 78.528 
Hypothesis Tests   
Restriction Test Statistic p-value 
H0: α1 = α2 0.399 0.528 
H0: κ1 = κ2 0.401 0.526 
H0: σ1 = σ2 3.788 0.052 
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Table 3.7: Specification Tests (3) 
Simulated Variables: , ,e Zτ  
Sample Split: 
Gawande 
Organizational 
Dummy 
Politically Organized 
N = 164 
Not Politically Organized 
N = 77  
Estimates   
α 2.998 2.822 
κ 3.001 3.022 
σ 4.004 3.957 
b0 5.049 5.033 
λ2 0.011 0.032 
λ3 0.009 0.031 
λ4 0.009 0.032 
Q(θ) 58.183 74.987 
Hypothesis Tests   
Restriction Test Statistic p-value 
H0: α1 = α2 1.056 0.304 
H0: κ1 = κ2 0.856 0.355 
H0: σ1 = σ2 2.545 0.111 
 
 
  
123 
 
Table 3.8: Hypothesis Tests 
Restriction Test Statistic p-value 
(i)         H0: α = 0 236.707 0.000 
(ii)        H0: b0 = 0 3.951 0.047 
(iii)       H0: κ = 1 78.286 0.000 
(iv)       H0: κ = σ – 1 0.149 0.483 
(v)        H0: α = 0.021 (GM) 170.39 0.000 
(vi)       H0: α = 0.905 (GB) 287.559 0.000 
(vii)      H0: α = 2 (GMM Appendix D) 47.147 0.000 
(viii)     H0: α = 2.5 (GMM Appendix D) 3.543 0.059 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 The principal objective of this dissertation research is to improve our 
understanding of the relationship between the volume of imports and the degree of 
trade protection.  The existing international trade literature considers this question 
from a very traditional perspective—trade policies affect trade flows and thereby 
influence economic outcomes for individuals and firms.  Yet this approach is limited 
in that it ignores the feedback effect of economic outcomes on policymaking.  That 
is, rational agents are motivated to influence the very policies that affect their 
economic fortunes.  Accordingly, this dissertation adopts a political economy 
perspective for analyzing the relationship between trade and trade policies.  In this 
view, trade policies are modeled as the outcome of a political process that is 
influenced by the economic outcomes the policies are designed to shape. 
 Chapter 1 describes the historical development of the literature on the 
political economy of trade and trade policy.  It outlines Grossman and Helpman’s 
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(1994) seminal paper, “Protection for Sale,” and illustrates the substantial influence 
this work has had on the subsequent literature.  Yet this model is not without its 
critics, and the weaknesses that have emerged have fueled much new theoretical and 
empirical research.  In particular, the model relies too much on political organization 
to explain variation across sectors in the relationship between the level of protection 
and the import-penetration ratio.  From a theoretical standpoint, this raises 
questions concerning the endogeneity of political organization and political 
contributions.  From an empirical perspective, this presents econometric challenges 
to inference that have not been adequately addressed in the existing literature. 
 As a response to the questions raised in chapter 1, this dissertation offers two 
important contributions.  First, chapter 2 presents a new political-economy model of 
trade and trade policy that provides important theoretical insights into the 
simultaneous relationship between trade, trade policy and political activity.  The 
limitations of the original PFS model have led many researchers to further develop 
and refine the political mechanisms.  By contrast, this dissertation adopts a more 
realistic and complex model of the underlying economy.  It combines the existing 
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political apparatus of the PFS framework with a model of the economy featuring 
monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, free entry, fixed and variable costs to 
trade.  This approach to modeling trade provides a richer economic environment 
than appears in the existing literature, and it affords us the opportunity to explore 
important counterfactual scenarios that influence decision-making. 
 Using this model we generate two new theoretical results.  First, when some 
barriers to trade are the result of policy decisions (i.e., tariffs) and other barriers to 
trade emerge more naturally (i.e., fixed market entry costs), import-competing 
industries have a greater incentive to seek policy protection when natural barriers 
are relatively low, all else equal.  That is, trade policy can substitute for natural 
barriers, but at a cost.  This cost takes the form of political contributions the 
industry must provide to the government as compensation for reducing consumer 
welfare.  This effect then drives the second theoretical result—a nonmonotonic 
relationship between the level of policy protection and the import-penetration ratio 
that is not dependent on exogenous variation in political organization or 
contributions.  Rather, we show that variation in the natural barrier to trade 
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produces industries that are differentially vulnerable to import competition and 
hence place distinctive values on policy protection.  Consequently, the level of the 
tariff, the volume of imports, the size of political contributions and the size and 
structure of each industry are all endogenously determined by the structural 
parameters and the natural barrier to trade.  This result is important because, like 
Grossman and Helpman, our model predicts different slopes in imports-tariff space 
for different groups of industries, but unlike Grossman and Helpman, we do not rely 
on differences in political organization as the source of exogenous variation. 
 One promising area for future research is to join the model of trade and the 
economy developed here with a model of lobby formation and endogenous political 
organization in the spirit of Mitra (1999) and Bombardini (2008).  Whereas these 
authors have extended the political apparatus of the PFS framework, thereby 
emphasizing industry-level variation in the costs of political organization, we have 
extended and refined the underlying model of the economy, emphasizing variation in 
the potential benefits.  A natural next step is to consider these two theoretical 
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developments concurrently and examine the relationship between trade and 
protection along both dimensions. 
 As a simple example, suppose that, in addition to a fixed cost of trade, each 
industry also faced a fixed cost of political organization where a high cost indicated 
substantial organizational hurdles.  In this case we might expect a strong positive 
association between these two types of costs.  High fixed costs of trade imply small 
benefits of tariffs, while high fixed costs of organization imply high costs of lobbying, 
resulting in industries that are politically passive, even in the face of new foreign 
competition.  At the other extreme, low fixed costs of trade imply large benefits of 
tariffs, while low fixed costs of organization imply low costs of lobbying, resulting in 
industries that are politically active, ready to jump at the slightest hint of increased 
imports.  In such a formulation the intermediate cases would prove the most 
revealing—to what degree do high costs of organization outweigh high motivation, or 
vice versa?  In addition, this theoretical structure could provide a window for 
examining how these two dimensions influence and interact with industrial 
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organization, thereby tightening the connection between endogenous market 
structure, trade flows and trade policy. 
 The second contribution of this dissertation consists of a structural estimation 
of the model parameters using U.S. data appearing in chapter 3.  The endogenous 
determination of so many key variables, while a strength of the theoretical model, 
poses substantial difficulties for estimation and inference.  Thus, we employ an 
estimation strategy—indirect inference—that is novel to the empirical trade and 
political economy literature but is well suited to handling a nonlinear system of 
simultaneous equations. 
 The parameter estimates are consistent with theoretical expectations and are 
shown to be robust to changes in the estimation algorithm.  Using sample splits 
informed by the literature, we show that the model specification and estimation 
results are not idiosyncratic.  More importantly, we show that the common practice 
of estimating separate coefficients for politically organized and unorganized 
industries is not warranted.  Our estimates suggest both groups of industries exercise 
political influence over trade policy decisions.  Nevertheless, there is some evidence 
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that the industry groupings defined by this variable do differ according to more 
fundamental demand ( )σ  and technological parameters ( )κ .  Thus inferences about 
the effect of political organization common in the literature are potentially plagued 
by simultaneity bias.      
 Estimating the relative weight the government places on political 
contributions is another common goal in the empirical literature.  When employing 
an empirical methodology that captures the structural connections among the 
endogenous variables and avoids common forms of bias, we estimate that the 
government favors the contributions of import-competing producers over consumer 
welfare at approximately a 3-to-1 rate.  That is, the pattern of trade and protection 
observed in the sample are consistent with a government that is willing to trade $3 
of consumer welfare for every $1 in additional contributions.  This estimate for α  is 
both substantively and statistically different from previous studies.  The evidence 
presented here both reinforces the utility of the political-economy approach to 
understanding the link between trade and trade policy and refines our understanding 
of the relative priorities of government decision-makers. 
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 The empirical results presented in chapter 3 suggest promising avenues for 
future research.  The indirect inference approach is remarkably flexible and could 
very easily be applied to discrete-choice problems such as predicting new trade flows 
at the country and/or industry level, predicting the decision to organize and lobby 
the government, and predicting the choice among a menu of different types of trade 
policies.  These applications potentially share many of the same econometric 
difficulties that appear here, especially nonlinearity and simultaneity, and so may 
prove amenable to the indirect inference methodology.  In addition, our results could 
potentially be improved by a larger and more representative data set.  A panel data 
structure would provide a boost to our degrees of freedom thereby enabling 
estimation of industry-specific parameters.  Similarly, a broader definition of trade 
policy protection would permit an extension of the model to less traditional forms of 
protection.  Indeed, the developed world has generally succeeded in lowering tariffs 
through the WTO, shifting much of the current political economy focus onto the use 
of such nontariff barriers as antidumping and countervailing duties.      
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APPENDIX A: 
NUMERICAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE CONCAVITY OF THE 
GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
 
 
 The following graphs examine numerically the shape and behavior of the 
government’s objective function as we vary the level of the tariff.  We show that it is 
concave for any interior solution, and that it is monotonically decreasing when the 
optimal policy is free trade.  This feature is robust to changes in the start-up cost, fe, 
the size of the domestic economy, EH, the scale parameter in the Pareto distribution, 
cm, and the fixed cost of serving the domestic market, f, and the fixed cost of trade, 
fx. 
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 Here we show that the concavity feature is robust to simultaneous changes in 
demand for home country exports, X, and the number of foreign firms attempting to 
sell in the home market, NF. 
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 Here we show that concavity feature is robust to simultaneous changes in the 
elasticity of substitution, σ , the shape parameter from the Pareto distribution, κ , 
and the weight the government places on political contributions, α .  In each graph 
the topmost curve with the smallest dashes is drawn for 2α = , while the middle 
curve is drawn for 1α =  and the lowest curve with the largest dashes is drawn for 
0α = . 
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APPENDIX B: 
PROOFS OF CLAIMS 1 AND 2 
 
 
Recall the notation: y
x
dy x
dx y
ε =  
Proof of Claim 1 
Using the expression for the import-penetration ratio in (2.14), 
 1 .FcZε κε
Θ Θ
= +  
Using the derivation of the cost cutoffs in (2.12), 
 
1
  and  .F H H H
c c
σ
σ
ε ε ε ε
∆ ∆
Θ Θ Θ Θ−
= − =  
Using the market-clearing condition for the domestic market, 
H H F
E R R= + ,  
 ( ) ( 1).H H F
N c c
H F
R Rε κε κε
Θ Θ Θ
+ = − +  
Using the market-clearing condition for exports in (2.13), 
 .H XN cε κε
Θ Θ
= −  
Using the free entry condition in (2.16), 
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 .H Xc c
H
R Xε ε
Θ Θ
= −  
Combining the equations above, 
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H
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and so  
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To prove the claim we must show 0Zε
Θ
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− −
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− − +
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Proof of Claim 2 
Using the expression for the import-penetration ratio given in (2.14), 
 1 .F
cZ
F F
ε κε= +  
Using the derivation of the cost cutoffs given in (2.12), 
 1
1
  and  .F H H H
c c
F F F Fσ
ε ε ε ε
∆ ∆
−
= − =  
Using the market-clearing condition for the domestic market, 
H H F
E R R= + ,  
 ( ) ( 1).H H F
N c c
H F F F F
R Rε κε κε+ = − +  
Using the market-clearing condition for exports in (2.13), 
 1 .H X
N c
F F
ε κε+ = −  
Using the free entry condition in (2.16), 
 .H X
c c
F H F
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Combining the equations above, 
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and so  
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APPENDIX C: 
NUMERICAL DEMONSTRATIONS OF CLAIMS 3 AND 4 
 
 
 The following graphs examine numerically the negative relationship between 
the fixed cost of trade and the endogenous tariff.  Below we show that the 
equilibrium relationship is robust to changes in the start-up cost, fe, the size of the 
domestic economy, EH, the scale parameter in the Pareto distribution, cm, and the 
fixed cost of serving the domestic market, f.  
 
 
 
 
 
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
fe = 0.5
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
fe = 1
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
fe = 2.5
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
fe = 5
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
EH = 1000
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
EH = 5000
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
EH = 50000
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
EH = 100000
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
cm = 0.75
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
cm = 1
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
cm = 10
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
cm = 100
0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
f = .5
2 3 4 5
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
f = 1
11 12 13 14 15
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
f = 10
30 35 40 45 50
F
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
f = 25
142 
 
 Here we show that the equilibrium relationship is robust to simultaneous 
changes in demand for home country exports, X, the number of foreign firms 
attempting to sell in the home market, NF, and the weight the government places on 
political contributions, α .  In each graph the topmost curve with the smallest dashes 
is drawn for 2.5α = , while the middle curve is drawn for 1α =  and the lowest 
curve with the largest dashes is drawn for 0α = . 
      X = 10                  X = 100                 X = 1000               X = 10000    
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 Here we show that the equilibrium relationship is robust to simultaneous 
changes in the elasticity of substitution, σ , the shape parameter from the Pareto 
distribution, κ , and the weight the government places on political contributions, α .  
In each graph the topmost curve with the smallest dashes is drawn for 2.5α = , 
while the middle curve is drawn for 1α =  and the lowest curve with the largest 
dashes is drawn for 0α = . 
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 The following graphs examine numerically the nonmonotonic relationship 
between the fixed cost of trade and the import-penetration ratio.  Below we show 
that the equilibrium relationship is robust to changes in the start-up cost, fe, the size 
of the domestic economy, EH, the scale parameter in the Pareto distribution, cm, and 
the fixed cost of serving the domestic market, f.  
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 Here we show that the equilibrium relationship is robust to simultaneous 
changes in demand for home country exports, X, the number of foreign firms 
attempting to sell in the home market, NF, and the weight the government places on 
political contributions, α .  In each graph the lowest curve with the smallest dashes 
is drawn for 2.5α = , while the middle curve is drawn for 1α =  and the highest 
curve with the largest dashes is drawn for 0α = . 
   X = 10                  X = 100                 X = 1000               X = 10000  
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 Here we show that the equilibrium relationship is robust to simultaneous 
changes in the elasticity of substitution, σ , the shape parameter from the Pareto 
distribution, κ , and the weight the government places on political contributions, α .  
In each graph the bottom curve with the smallest dashes is drawn for 2.5α = , while 
the middle curve is drawn for 1α =  and the highest curve with the largest dashes is 
drawn for 0α = . 
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APPENDIX E: 
EXPERIMENTING WITH INDIRECT INFERENCE 
 
 
 The choice to employ the method of indirect inference is driven by the 
potential for multiple endogenous relationships and the inherent nonlinearity of the 
theoretical model being estimated.  This method more commonly appears in time-
series applications (Broze et al., 1995; Pastorello et al., 2000), but there are a 
growing number of microeconometric examples.  This appendix is designed to 
demonstrate the usefulness of indirect inference for overcoming the above-mentioned 
problems that often plague standard econometric approaches and inhibit valid 
inferences. 
 Our first step is to construct a hypothetical model that shares the structure 
and features of the model in the text.  Consider the following two-equation model, 
 
1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 2 1
y a x a x a x a x a y ε= + + + + +  (E.1) 
 
2 1 1 2 1 3 2
log( ) log( ) log( )y b x b y b ε= + + , (E.2) 
where y1 and y2 are endogenous variables, x1-x4 are exogenous variables drawn from 
independent uniform distributions and a1-a5, b1-b3 are parameters.  Note that both 
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equations include endogenous variables on the right-hand side, and that equation 2 is 
nonlinear in the parameters.  The error terms are drawn from independent normal 
distributions with mean zero; b3 captures the ratio of their standard deviations. 
 With the exogenous variables and error terms in hand, we can simulate values 
for the two endogenous variables for any set of parameters by solving the nonlinear 
system.  Let the true values of the parameters be as follows: 
 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3
2 0.2 1 0.5 0.75
1 1.5 0.5
a a a a a
b b b
= = = = =
= = − =
 
With an N of 250, these parameter values generate a y1 with mean 11.025 and 
standard deviation 4.078 and a y2 with mean 0.0829 and a standard deviation 0.056. 
 Equation (E.1) constitutes the auxiliary model, so we estimate its five 
coefficients using a standard OLS approach, understanding the potential for bias.  
Let β  represent the resulting coefficient vector.  Estimation results are presented in 
table E.1. 
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Table E.1: Auxiliary Model 
OLS Regression: Dependent Variable y1  (N = 250) 
Regressor β  Std. Error 
1
x  2.039 0.037 
2
x  0.221 0.033 
3
x  0.999 0.032 
4
x  0.510 0.032 
2
y  -1.739 1.045 
    
 
These coefficient estimates function as targets for choosing estimates of the 
parameters that produce simulation results that most closely match the behavior 
captured by β .  Notice that the OLS coefficient estimates for a1-a4 are fairly close to 
the true values, but the estimate on a5 is more than twice the true value and carries 
the wrong sign.  This is an illustration of the estimation bias that occurs when 
ignoring the endogeneity of a regressor.  
 Let b( )θ  represent the binding functions (one for each element of β ) defined 
in the main text.  They represent the corresponding coefficient estimates for the 
auxiliary model for a given set of parameter values, averaged over 75 simulations.  
Similarly, let Q( )θ  represent the criterion function defined in the main text.  It is a 
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measure of the distance of the values in the binding functions to the values in β .  
The optimization procedure therefore minimizes Q( )θ  with respect to θ . 
 One important note: the dimension of θ (k) must be less than or equal to the 
dimension of β  (l).  Thus we fix 
2 3 4 1
, , ,a a a b  at their true values and estimate the 
rest.  This provides us with one degree of freedom with which we can perform an 
overidentification test using Hansen’s J.  The resulting parameter estimates and 
criterion value are presented in table E.2. 
 
Table E.2: Indirect Inference Estimation Results 
Simulated Variables: y1, y2 
Parameter Estimate 
1
a  2.020 
5
a  0.767 
2
b  -1.649 
3
b  0.635 
Q( )θ  0.460 
      
 
 The parameter estimates are all fairly close to their true values.  Of particular 
interest is the coefficient estimate for a5.  Recall that a standard application of OLS 
resulted in a biased estimate for this parameter.  By contrast, the indirect inference 
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procedure has generated a coefficient estimate that is quite close to the true value, 
even though it used the biased OLS coefficient estimate as a target for matching. 
 As discussed in Davidson and MacKinnon (2004), the minimized value of the 
criterion function is distributed as 2( )l kχ − .  This allows us to test the 
overidentifying restrictions using Hansen’s J.  The null hypothesis of this test is that 
the overidentifying restrictions are appropriately chosen, so a rejection of the null 
casts suspicion on the parameter estimates.  The test statistic is 0.460 with a p-value 
of 0.859.  Hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis; although overidentified, the 
minimized value of the criterion function is sufficiently small to support the 
parameter estimates.  This should come as no surprise—we know with certainty that 
the restricted coefficients are properly chosen, so we would expect no statistical 
difference when choosing a different subset of parameters to estimate.  We interpret 
this result as favorable to the method. 
 We can also test individual elements of the vector θ  by comparing the 
restricted and unrestricted values of Q( )θ .  This approach is often used to test 
whether restricting a parameter to zero has any statistically significant effect on the 
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minimized value of the criterion function.  Here, we will test whether there is any 
statistically significant difference between the value of Q( )θ  as reported above and 
the value of the minimized criterion function when a given parameter is set to its 
true value.  The results are presented in table E.3. 
 
Table E.3: Selected Hypothesis Tests 
Restriction Test Statistic p-value 
1
2a =  0.321 0.904 
5
0.75a =  0.424 0.871 
2
1.5b = −  0.239 0.929 
3
0.5b =  0.116 0.966 
      
 
Normally, we would hope for large differences in the minimized criterion 
values, producing large test statistics and small p-values, leading us to reject the null 
hypotheses.  In this case, however, we restrict each element of the parameter vector 
to its known true value, and construct the null hypotheses to reflect this choice.  
Thus, failing to reject the null in each test is interpreted as lending support to the 
method.  Put differently, the results lead us to (correctly) fail to reject null 
hypotheses we know to be true. 
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 To summarize, in this appendix we have constructed a two-equation model 
characterized by endogenous relationships and nonlinear parameters.  The method of 
indirect inference, using an N of 250 and 75 simulations, produced parameter results 
that are reasonably close to their known true values.  In addition, using these 
estimates and the value of the minimized criterion function, we drew the correct 
conclusions in a test of the overidentifying restrictions and when testing individual 
elements of the parameter vector.  These results give us confidence when employing 
the method of indirect inference to the model in chapter 3, whose structure is similar 
and for which we have a data set of comparable size. 
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